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LWF/DWS Haiti & Caribbean Country Strategy 2009-2014 External Evaluation

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Cover: aerial photograph of the road dividing Haiti (left) and the Dominican Republic (right)
Source: UNEP

List of Acronyms

CARE	Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCO	Comité de Coordination des ONG / NGO Coordination Committee
CEFOC	Centre de Formation Communautaire de Thiotte
CLIO	Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG
CODAB	Coordination des Organisations pour le Développement de l'Arrondissement de Belle-Anse (former LWF partner)
COOPCAB	Coopérative des Planteurs de Café de l'Arrondissement de Belle-Anse
COPP	Country Operational Program Plan
CPIO	Comite Permanent Inter-Organisations
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ELCA	Evangelical Lutheran Church of America
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EU	European Union
FNGA	Fondation Nouvelle Grande Anse (LWF partner)
GIS	Global Information System
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
LWF-DWS	Lutheran World Federation – Department of World Services, Geneva
MUSO	Mutuelle de Solidarité (micro-credit group)
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
PMER	Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation & Reporting (system)
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNEP	United Nations Environment Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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We particularly appreciated the constructive and open dialogue while in Haiti – the desire for learning and continuous improvement is clearly an important part of LWF Haiti’s “culture” and was critical to our analysis, given the relatively short time we had available.

Executive summary

Evaluation Purpose

This external evaluation was conducted a year before the current six-year strategy comes to a close at the end of December 2014 and its purpose is to contribute to both to learning and accountability by:

- Providing an informed and independent assessment of the achievements and gaps in the work of LWF-Haiti/Caribbean (hereafter referred to as “LWF Haiti”),
- Evaluating to what extent the program reached the effectiveness, the efficiency and the sustainability required both within and outside the country,
- Providing a learning opportunity through a thorough in-depth analysis of quality and outcome, the relevance of main activities, approaches and strategic directions of the country strategy regarding the changed context of Haiti,
- Providing relevant guidance to support the development of the next strategy (for 2015-2020), including identifying priorities to be considered based on consultation with key stakeholders.

Haiti Context - Haiti remains the poorest country in the Americas and is one of the poorest in the world with significant gaps in basic services. A contributing factor to Haiti’s extreme vulnerability is its exposure to natural disaster hazards. These are usually in the form of hurricane or droughts, but in January 2010 a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti that amplified existing challenges and created massive reconstruction needs. 1.5 million people were internally displaced. The Haitian economy has been gradually recovering but other challenges remain in the form of repeated tropical storms, cholera epidemics, severe environmental degradation, weak governance and human rights violations.

LWF Haiti’s Strategy - The strategy covered the period 2009-2014 and focused on livelihoods and environment. The strategy was based on a context of environmental vulnerability, identified as a priority in Haiti’s Poverty Reduction Strategy. LWF Haiti’s strategy is also closely aligned with the LWF-DWS Global Strategy.

LWF’s program has ongoing development projects in the South East, the West and the Grande Anse Departments and phased out some projects in eastern Haiti during 2012¹. Activities are designed to address poverty alleviation through organizational strengthening, community development and supporting productive alliances and environmental protection.

During the response to the 2010 earthquake, LWF began implementing activities in affected areas in and around Gressier, Léogane, Grand-Gôave and Petit-Gôave and this has been followed on with recovery activities, such as the Model Village in Gressier, and development activities with a new local partner in Les Palmes.

¹ The LWF Country Program also implemented activities in the Dominican Republic from 2009 to 2011, but these were not considered during this evaluation due to time and other constraints.

Evaluation Methodology - The methodology for this included a desk review, semi-structured individual interviews, visits to project sites and group interviews during a two-week field visit to Haiti during January 2014. A total of 139 persons were interviewed during the course of this evaluation including community members, NGO consortia coordinators and staff from LWF (Haiti and HQ), LWF partners, UN, peer NGOs, donors, and the Haitian government. As there was a focus in the TOR on learning, the evaluation team facilitated a day's workshop for LWF Haiti staff and partners at the end of the field visit to validate recommendations and retrospectively construct key components of LWF Haiti's Theory of Change.

Main Findings

Relevance - Priorities chosen by LWF for Haiti remained as relevant at the end of the strategy as at the beginning, although a "detour" was needed to deal with the impact of the earthquake in January 2010. A key lesson from the current strategy to be considered when developing the next strategy is to use a scenario-based approach.

Although LWF Haiti has identified a niche that continues to be relevant, the next strategy needs to be flexible enough to adapt to a dramatic change in the operational context. LWF is well-respected and relatively influential at community and regional levels, but there is little awareness of LWF's strategic priorities at a national level in Haiti. There have been periodic attempts by LWF Haiti's leadership to engage at senior levels of government and UN agencies involved in environmental protection and livelihoods. However, LWF's relatively low profile at a national level has meant that they are not seen as a major player in any particular sector, even though the overall reputation of LWF by external stakeholders is positive.

Effectiveness - LWF has been mainly effective at a community and regional level, where there is evidence of solid outcomes. From a rights-based perspective, findings indicate that LWF's work has mainly focused on empowering right-holders with less attention being given to influencing duty-bearers, at least at a national and global level. Effectiveness was hampered by the lack of a shared Theory of Change to help prioritize and link activities, particularly since the strategy was not updated to reflect a changed operating environment following the earthquake. As a result, the vast majority of LWF Haiti's resources and operational capacities were devoted to activities outside the scope of the strategy.

Efficiency - LWF Haiti has made progress in addressing inefficiencies identified in the 2011 mid-term evaluation, but some remain unaddressed, including remaining gaps in the envisaged "learning loop" for LWF's monitoring and evaluation systems. The main investments during this period have been relief and recovery operations. The Model Village, where LWF has already invested over 4 million Euros, is the largest single investment, making it crucial for LWF to both ensure its sustainability and capture and share learning from this experience. Operational efficiency has been affected by frequent staff turnover and the resulting restructuring and support systems have not necessarily been adapted to new structures. There were also long delays in transferring funds to partners at the beginning of each calendar year, although LWF did rectify this problem in 2014.

Outcome and Impact Measurement - LWF has improved its monitoring and evaluation systems since the 2011 mid-term evaluation, including more use of baseline information in monitoring. Nevertheless, with some exceptions, the evidence of outcomes and impact of LWF's work is largely anecdotal and there is a need to improve measurement and communication of outcomes and impact. It should be noted that this is not only a problem confined to LWF Haiti. Measuring aid effectiveness is recognized as a global challenge by international agencies, and LWF-DWS HQ is currently taking steps to strengthen their global systems.

Sustainability - A key feature that helps to ensure the sustainability of LWF Haiti's interventions is the emphasis on a participatory approach with both partners and communities. LWF Haiti's capacity and learning from prior experience (such as coffee cooperatives in eastern Haiti) positions them well to continue to improve through, for example, developing multi-year community plans and capacity building plans for partners with measurable benchmarks (as originally foreseen in the strategy) to help define sustainable exit strategies.

Emergency Preparedness & DRR - The earthquake highlighted one of LWF'S main "value-added" in the Haiti context, namely hands-on support to relief and recovery operations following a large disaster event. Haiti stands out in the region in a number of ways, including its status as a fragile state, comparatively low national disaster response capacity, high levels of vulnerability, different language and culture. Findings confirm that LWF's integration of DRR with development and environment protection activities is an appropriate strategy and the emergency structure and standby capacity in Leogane is likely to play a key support role during future emergency responses, not just for LWF Haiti, but for other ACT Alliance members.

LWF Partnerships - The current strategy saw LWF Haiti transition from direct implementation to working through local partners in its development projects. The earthquake put strains on this transition, but LWF emerged with strengthened relationships, not only with their local partners, but also several Related Agencies. In contrast, LWF has made relatively little progress in forging strategic partnerships at higher levels that could increase their influence and impact.

Organizational Management - LWF Haiti has coped relatively well with the strains of managing in rapidly changing, and often stressful, operating conditions and deserves credit for emerging from this experience with a team that remains so motivated and committed to LWF Haiti's vision and mission. The frequent restructuring exercises appear to be mainly driven by project budgets, while administrative systems, information management, and support to longer-term strategic goals were not necessarily suited to the new configurations.

Recommendations

Recommendations are provided at the end of this report targeted at four separate groups; LWF Haiti, LWF-DWS HQ (Geneva), LWF Haiti Partners and LWF Related Agencies operating in Haiti. These are sub-categorized in terms of timeframe, i.e. those that should be implemented prior to the end of the current strategy (by

December 2014) and those to be considered when planning the next strategy. Based on findings from this evaluation, the following recommendations are seen as being of particular importance:

LWF Haiti

- Clarify the Theory of Change (ToC) for LWF Haiti's current strategy to better define expected outcomes and use this as a foundation for development of the next strategy. The Theory of Change should emphasize resilience based on a rights-based approach, analyzing and addressing strengths and weaknesses of both the Haitian communities and individuals as rights-holders and the duty bearers (government authorities, LWF staff) at different levels.
- Review and revise the communication strategy based on LWF Haiti's stakeholder map to include, for example, more systematic reporting to government authorities and more effective communication with partners.
- Strengthen monitoring, evaluation and information management systems, together with partners and communities.
- Carry out a review of human resource capacity and systems to help fill capacity gaps and increase efficiency.
- Maintain a standby emergency capacity in Haiti, while seeking partners to share facilities and costs.
- Agree on benchmarks to track progress of partners in terms of capacity development and sustainability.
- Benchmarks should also be developed in consultation with Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) based on their respective community development plans.

LWF-DWS HQ

- LWF-DWS should identify their role as a critical part of LWF Haiti's Theory of Change, notably in terms of specific technical support and their potential global advocacy role.
- While Climate Change Justice and Environment Protection are an important component of the global strategy, experience from Haiti suggests that LWF-DWS needs to enhance their capacity to provide necessary technical support and guidance at a global level for priority themes in the LWF-DWS strategy.
- Support Country Programs to review and revise their strategies following a major change in the operating environment (such as the 2010 Earthquake) using a scenario-based approach.
- Maintain an emergency response capacity and infrastructure for LWF-DWS as part of their added-value in Haiti.
- While revising the PMER system, LWF-DWS should include guidance on evaluability assessments to estimate time and resources required for a useful

product and ensure that expectations are clear. Practical guidance to help Country Programs prepare for evaluations should also be developed.

- Support LWF Haiti (and other Country Programs) by supporting improvements in planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER) systems, notably in terms of outcome measurement, synthesized reporting systems and information management systems.
- Support LWF Haiti as needed with a review of their human resource capacity and assessment of capacity building needs.

LWF Partners in Haiti

- Improve mutual understanding regarding LWF Haiti's strategy, vision, mission and institutional commitments to clarify expectations, preferred ways of working and mutual accountability during collaborative processes.
- Actively participate in LWF Haiti's planning process for their next strategy and come prepared to clearly communicate the partner's own strategic objectives and commitments to which they wish to be accountable for.

Related Agencies

- Clarify and seek consensus with LWF-DWS Haiti on the respective strengths, roles and value-added, to identify options for 'win-win' collaboration.
- Clarify respective agency positions should LWF Haiti and their partners decide to adopt an approach that focuses on resilience.
- Update joint contingency planning for disasters, including a continuing to follow up on recommendations from the 2011 evaluation of the ACT Alliance response to the earthquake. Consider cost-sharing arrangements for LWF Haiti's standby capacity in Leogane.

Introduction

Purpose and Expected Use of the Evaluation

This external evaluation was carried out a year before the current six-year strategy comes to a close at the end of December 2014 and its primary purpose is to.

- Provide an informed and independent assessment of the achievements and gaps in the work of LWF-Haiti/Caribbean,
- Evaluate to what extent the program reached the effectiveness, the efficiency and the sustainability required both within and outside the country,
- Provide a learning opportunity through a thorough in-depth analysis of quality and outcome, the relevance of main activities, approaches and strategic directions of the country strategy regarding the changed context of Haiti,
- Provide relevant guidance to support the development of the next strategy (for 2015-2020), including identifying priorities to be considered based on consultation with key stakeholders.

This evaluation is expected to contribute to both towards learning and accountability, assessing relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, outcomes/impacts, sustainability and organizational management of LWF's strategy and program.

The Haitian Context

Haiti remains the poorest country in the Americas and, with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of US\$ 760 in 2012, is one of the poorest in the world with significant gaps in basic services. Over half of its population of 10 million lives on less than US\$1 per day, and approximately 80% live on less than US\$2 per day.²

A magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti on January 12, 2010 amplifying existing challenges and creating massive reconstruction needs. Of the 1.5 million people who were internally displaced people, over 1.3 million had left the camps and relocated by the end of 2013. The Haitian economy has been recovering since the earthquake³ and most of the displaced have moved out of camps. Growth has been modest, but macroeconomic stability has been maintained and inflation controlled, despite the impacts of repeated hurricanes and tropical storms such as Isaac and Sandy, droughts, and agricultural pests.

As the two figures illustrate below, aid flows to Haiti are directly linked to disaster frequency, with an influx of aid immediately following each disaster event. During

² Source: World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>


³ The World Bank estimates that economic growth reached 4.3% in fiscal year 2013, up from the 2.8% observed in 2012. This has been mainly attributed to a pick-up in agricultural production, as well as the construction and industrial sectors particularly the textile and garment industries. Inflation for fiscal year 2013 is estimated to have reached 4.5%.

the period between 2004 and 2012 there were three disaster events that caused either significant damage and/or mortality; Hurricanes Ivan and Jeanne (2004), Hurricanes Gustav and Hanna (2008) and the 2010 Earthquake.

Figure 1 Net Bilateral Aid Flows from DAC Donors (US\$) to Haiti⁴



Figure 2 Trends in Humanitarian Aid to Haiti⁵



⁴ <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/haiti/net-bilateral-aid-flows-from-dac-donors-ireland-us-dollar-wb-data.html>

⁵ Source: UEH Tulane DRLA Haiti Humanitarian Aid Evaluation Knowledge Center

The following sections describe the status of cross-cutting issues highlighted in LWF Haiti's strategy.

Environmental Issues

Environmental degradation is a significant cause of vulnerability in Haiti. In 1923, forests covered nearly 60% of the country; today (as illustrated on the cover of this report) forest cover is less than 2% due to a combination of weak regulatory capacities, corruption, and poverty. Most Haitians still depend on wood and charcoal as their primary fuel source.⁶ A 15-year Environment Action Plan was authorized by the Haitian government in 1999 along with a proposal to stop deforestation by developing alternative fuel sources but political instability and lack of funding have limited the impact of this reform effort. Deforestation has serious effects on many aspects of Haitian life; from aggravating drought, to increasing the burden – particularly on women – to access clean water along with severe soil erosion that decreases agricultural yields and can transform heavy rainfall into severe landslides.⁷

Gender Issues

Gender equity is a key focus of LWF Haiti's strategy. Under the Haiti's Constitution women have equal constitutional rights to men in the economic, political, cultural and social fields, as well as in the family. However, most studies indicate that the reality for many women in Haiti is different from the law. Violence against women is a serious problem in Haiti, estimated to affect 28 % among women aged 15-49 years and 43 % among women aged 15-19 in marital or conjugal relationships. Economically, women are 66% active in the workforce although women lack equal access to productive resources and professional development opportunities.⁸

Human Rights

Haiti's constitution and written laws meet most international human rights standards but compliance is poor and human rights violations are frequently documented. Political instability, the lasting effects of the January 2010 earthquake, and the persistence of a deadly cholera epidemic are seen to hinder efforts by the Haitian government's to meet the basic needs of its people and address long-standing human rights problems.⁹

⁶ Library of Congress (2006) Country Profile - Haiti <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf>

⁷ This was the case in Gonaives 2007 during the passage of Hurricane Hanna, which had been downgraded to a tropical storm by the time it reached the highlands above the city but nevertheless buried most of Gonaives under 3-4 meters of mud.


⁸ *Éléments de la condition et de la situation des femmes en Haïti*, MCFDF, Juillet 2006

⁹ <http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/haiti>

Background of LWF Haiti's Current Strategy and Program

The strategy is focused on livelihoods and environment, in a context of environmental vulnerability, in line with priorities identified in Haiti's Poverty Reduction Strategy¹⁰. LWF Haiti's strategy is also closely aligned with the LWF-DWS Global Strategy.


Figure 3 Key Components of LWF Haiti's Strategic Plan: 2008-2014



The 2011 Mid-Term Evaluation found the LWF Country Strategy to be still relevant although there were challenges to implementing it. Recommendations included developing a baseline, revising the Country Operations Program Plan and reducing staff turnover. There were follow up meetings to address these recommendations and a revised Project Document was produced covering the period 2012-2014 that took into account some of these recommendations.

¹⁰ International Monetary Fund (2008) Haiti Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté

Figure 4 Key Milestones during LWF Haiti's current strategy



The comparative advantage (value-added) of LWF Haiti when the current strategy was established in 2008 was based on:

- LWF's long experience working in the country, its institutional framework as a global faith-based organization with a wide network including the related agencies
- LWF is being identified as a faith-based and impartial; an important asset in tense social situations.
- LWF belongs to several networks, working both with locally based NGO-networks and as an international NGO related to the UN system worldwide.
- Related agencies¹¹ identified in Haiti as focus country reflected in their strategies both globally and regionally
- LWF had a relatively stable funding base and medium term perspectives for future funding.

¹¹ None of the Related Agencies had a permanent presence in Haiti in 2008 and so relied on LWF Haiti for analysis and operational support. A number of Related Agencies have now established a permanent presence and their own programs working through local actors.

LWF Project Sites

The program has had development projects in the South East, the West and the Grande Anse Departments¹² although phased out some projects in the Dominican Republic and in eastern Haiti (implemented by LWF's partner CODAB) in 2012. Activities are designed to address poverty alleviation through organizational strengthening, community development and supporting productive alliances, environmental protection in Forêt des Pins and Macaya.

During the 2010 emergency response, LWF began implementing activities in areas in and around Gressier, Léogane, Grand-Gôave and Petit-Gôave which were severely affected by the January 12th earthquake. While there was a surge of displaced population of about 10-15% in the long-term project areas in the immediate months after the earthquake, the majority was reported by the UN to have already returned to the Port au Prince area during 2010.

In 2012 LWF resumed collaboration with RODEP in three municipalities in Grand-Goâve (Tête-à-Boeuf) and Petit-Goâve (9th and 10th sections of Les Palmes), this time long-term implementing development project activities, including capacity building for communities, Livelihood, Natural Disaster and Risks Management, and Psychosocial Activities.

Methodology

The methodology for this evaluation used a mixed-methods approach including a desk review, semi-structured individual interviews, visits to project sites and group interviews during a two-week field visit to Haiti in January 2014. To ensure data integrity and factual accuracy team members periodically compared, triangulate and analyze data collected during the course of an evaluation.

A total of 139 persons were interviewed during the course of this evaluation.¹³ Staff from LWF and, in the case of community focus group discussions, partners were not present during interviews. Focus group discussions were both disaggregated by sex and mixed groups. Interviews with other external stakeholders were also conducted without LWF staff being present. Those interviewed during the course of this evaluation included:

- 70 community members (23 men, 47 women) in 8 focus group discussions (of which 2 where only women were present) and one individual interview;
- 29 staff and 1 former staff from LWF Haiti (18 men, 11 women);
- 1 current and 1 former staff member from LWF-DWS HQ (1 of each)
- 23 staff from partners (20 men, 3 women);

¹² A map and complete list of projects is provided in the Annex.

¹³ A list of names and other details is attached as an Annex.

- 10 staff (6 men, 4 women) from government, a donor, NGO consortia, the United Nations and peer NGOs; and
- 5 staff from Related Agencies (1 man, 4 women).

Each team member was assigned focal point responsibilities for specific themes and issues to ensure an adequate coverage of documentation, analysis, documentation on key issues emerging from interviews and focus-group discussion while also creating periodic opportunities for validation by key stakeholders.

Given the focus in the TOR on learning, specific emphasis was given to maximizing learning and utilization of results for key stakeholders, and this process included of a day long workshop¹⁴ for LWF Haiti staff and partners that was facilitated by evaluation team members at the end of the field mission to validate recommendations and review components of LWF Haiti's Theory of Change.

Limitations and Constraints

As predicted in the Inception Report, the relatively short time allocated to the field visit (only two weeks) meant that the team's ability to assess results was dependent on the quality and accessibility of relevant data (baselines, monitoring reports and evaluations). Gaps in baseline data and results had already been identified as a constraint to performance measurement in the 2011 Mid-Term Evaluation. Although LWF Haiti has since taken steps to remedy the situation, data available to the team did not allow a systematic review and validation of results with a two-week field visit as foreseen by the scope of the TOR. Turnover and gaps in staffing in LWF Haiti had been cited as a key challenge in the Mid-Term Evaluation and, although this appears to have improved, this created challenges for the team in obtaining historical insights from interviewees¹⁵. This turnover also appeared to have had a knock-on effect on LWF Haiti's information management system as data requested was not always readily available, something that was also highlighted as a serious gap by the Mid-Term Evaluation.

Main Findings

Findings below are organized into separate sections assessing the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Outcomes/Impacts, Sustainability, Emergency Preparedness/DRR, Partnership and Organizational Management of LWF Haiti's strategy.

¹⁴ The agenda and evaluation of the workshop by participants is attached as an annex.

¹⁵ The team nevertheless able to interview a former Country Representative and a former LWF-DWS Program Officer.

Relevance

“Although environmental indicators were already at warning levels, the earthquake put further pressure on the environment and natural resources, thus increasing the extreme vulnerability of the Haitian people”.¹⁶


The operational areas originally prioritized by LWF in 2009 are adjacent to some of the last remaining natural reserves in Haiti and were linked to strategic objectives. While this choice was relevant at the time, the effects of the 2010 earthquake has meant that LWF Haiti has effectively been operating outside of their strategy for most of the period and that strategic guidance for new areas where they established operations after the earthquake (Gressier, Palmes) has been largely based on activities being implemented in Macaya and Thiotte.

A proposed alternative strategy¹⁷ was developed during early 2011 by LWF Haiti’s former management with the help of a consultant that aimed to supplement LWF’s relief activities in the affected areas around Port au Prince with a strategic focus on livelihoods and environmental protection in Macaya and Grand’Anse targeted at both resident and displaced populations. With an overall goal of poverty alleviation, a specific objective was to offer poor people who had moved out of Port au Prince area after the earthquake to seek shelter with relatives with adequate livelihood opportunities and social infrastructure so that they were not forced to return to the slums of Port au Prince for socio-economic reasons.

¹⁶ International Monetary Fund (2012) Haiti – Update on the Reconstruction, Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy.

¹⁷ Document du Programme 2011-2014 de la Fédération Luthérienne Mondiale (FLM) Version Préliminaire – le 7 Mars 2011.


Figure 5 Displacement following the Earthquake¹⁸



In the end, LWF-DWS HQ did not approve the alternative strategy. It is beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess the feasibility or likely impact of the proposed alternative strategy on LWF's program. However, the fact that a drastic change in the operating environment in Haiti following the earthquake did not result in a review and revision of the strategy does indicate there may be a significant gap in LWF-DWS global planning systems given that the vast majority of LWF Haiti's resources and operational capacities were subsequently devoted to activities that were outside the scope of the strategy. The result was a parallel program for relief and recovery activities along with development of separate objectives and indicators for emergency and recovery operations while development programming was put on hold during much of 2010.

¹⁸ OCHA (2011) Haiti Earthquake Response One-Year Factsheet. January 2011
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/ocha_haiti_one_year_factsheet.pdf

Figure 6 LWF Haiti Annual Budgets (Emergency vs. Non-Emergency)¹⁹



Apart from the absence of a revised strategy to guide LWF Haiti’s operations in a drastically changed environment, the other key gap identified during this evaluation has been the lack of a Theory of Change shared between LWF Haiti and its partners to promote strategic outcomes.

Link with Statement of Needs (SoN)

In common with most other LWF Country Programs around the world, LWF Haiti is highly dependent on project funding. While some of LWF’s Related Agencies remain reliable sources of funding for LWF Haiti SoN projects, others are experiencing increasing challenges in continuing to fund LWF Haiti’s SoN as they have in the past. Based on findings from document review and interviews, these challenges appear to be partly due to a desire by Related Agencies to prioritize objectives in their own strategies. Some are also facing increasing pressure from their back donors who want to see evidence of value-added of an additional layer using international NGOs as a pass-through mechanism to local partners.

Findings from this evaluation indicate that LWF Haiti has been able to successfully link most of its own its strategic objectives to those of Related Agencies, notably in areas such as psychosocial programming, where LWF Haiti appears to have successfully linked with priorities such as livelihoods. LWF Haiti has faced more challenges in demonstrating its value around the theme of climate change justice. The evaluation team found that LWF’s approach and expertise puts them in a good

¹⁹ Based on figures extracted from various reports (Annual Reports, 2011 Audit Report and Working Budgets for 2013-2014)

position to help advance the resilience agenda in Haiti²⁰. In any case, it is clear that the need to address extreme vulnerability due to pressure on natural resources along with Haiti's status as a fragile state makes resilience a more tangible objective than climate change justice even though this may be a longer-term goal. This is summed up by ECHO's Head of Operations:

*"I am deeply persuaded that the resilience agenda is a key one in countries like Haiti, or others in Africa where we are currently very much involved, where the humanitarian challenges come from recurrent structural problems. When we develop an agenda of resilience, we work so that each time there is a crisis we do not go back five steps for every two steps forward we had made."*²¹

Link with LWF-DWS Global Strategy

The strategy is very well-aligned with the LWF-DWS global strategy in virtually all aspects; DRR, emergency preparedness and response, environmental protection, sustainable livelihoods and community-led action for justice and peace. As described above, LWF Haiti's challenges lie in operationalization and demonstrating outcomes and tangible influence at national and global levels.

Relevance – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

The priorities chosen by LWF for Haiti remain as relevant at the end of the strategy as at the beginning, despite the "detour" needed to deal with the impact of the earthquake in January 2010. Key lessons from the current strategy that need to be considered when developing the next strategy suggest adopting a scenario-based approach. , Although LWF Haiti has identified a niche that continues to be relevant, the next strategy needs to be ready adapt to a dramatic change in operational context.

While LWF is well-respected and influential at community and regional levels. There have been periodic attempts by LWF Haiti's leadership to engage at senior levels of government and UN agencies involved in environmental protection and livelihoods. However, LWF's relatively low profile at a national level and has meant that they are not viewed as a major player in any particular sector even though they have a relatively positive reputation.

Effectiveness

In general, LWF has been reasonably effective in implementing strategic objectives at a community level. LWF was not the only agency in Haiti that experienced difficulties in dealing with a combination of a challenging operating environment

²⁰ See Turnbull, M. et al. (2013) for practical guidance on links between DRR, resilience and climate change.

²¹ Quote by ECHO's Head of Operations in May 2013, a member of the "Political Champions of Resilience" group established in 2012 composed of high-ranking officials from leading international institutions in an effort to put resilience on top of the agenda. It was no coincidence that Haiti was chosen as the venue to launch this initiative during a two-day meeting in April 2013.

and frequent staff turnover following the 2010 earthquake, but despite various challenges and gaps delivered a reasonably effective response.²² LWF's prior experience in Haiti accompanied by effective participatory approaches throughout the project cycle and, including when developing their gender strategy during 2013, were judged to have helped improve effectiveness.

As noted in the Methodology section above, time constraints along with difficulties in accessing relevant data meant that a thorough analysis of effectiveness across the program was not feasible during this evaluation. Some examples that represent some of the major programming areas are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1 Effectiveness of Selected Projects – Illustrative Examples

Project Activity	Effective?	Positive	Areas of concern
Model Village in Gressier	Yes	LWF has done better than most other agencies at implementing housing programs ²³ . External stakeholders interviewed all had positive feedback about this project acknowledging it as a solution that lifted 150 families out of poverty and reduced their vulnerability. At least one ACT Alliance member has replicated some of the housing designs for their own project. LWF's rights-based approach with communities has resulted in strong gender-balanced community leadership that is progressively taking on more responsibility for engaging with local authorities.	Lack of recreational facilities ²⁴ . The real test whether this is really a "model" is whether a sustainable solution can be identified for water supply.
MUSO: (micro-credit)	Yes (although coverage is currently	MUSO demonstrate high level of motivation and good repayment rates (97%). Contingency funds available for "emergencies"	Lack of micro-credit technical expertise in LWF and partners, resulting in gaps in monitoring and

²² McGearty, S. et al. (2012)

²³ HAITI: Reconstruction's Housing Projects Still Plagued with Problems Four Years After the Earthquake <http://www.globalresearch.ca/haiti-reconstructions-housing-projects-still-plagued-with-problems-four-years-after-the-earthquake/5364749>

²⁴ Recreational facilities for the Model Village are planned as part of the 2014 work plan.

Project Activity	Effective?	Positive	Areas of concern
	limited)	although probably not sufficient for large disaster events. ²⁵	technical advice. Lack of diversity (mostly small scale retail). Lack of a program strategy/ToC to create a wider network to broaden impact. ²⁶
Staff Capacity Building in Human Rights ²⁷	Poor	Two of three planned courses were conducted in 2011 and 2012 for the LWF staff and partners. Assessments of staff were done upon conclusion of each training activity.	Lack of planning. Training not completed, no assessments or monitoring tools delivered as per contract.

LWF Haiti’s strategy targets poor communities and they use an approach that promotes ownership and sustainability through encouraging active participation, including financial contributions. Observations and interviews with community members indicate that this means that the poorest people benefit from community-based support from LWF (such as community water supplies) but, with the exception of relief items, they do not always figure amongst individuals targeted by LWF projects. Findings indicate that the emphasis on participation is successful at promoting ownership and sustainability, however interviews indicate that there are different expectations from donors and gaps in outcome measurement data make it difficult to understand the effects on the poorest constituents where LWF is providing assistance.

Apart from the changed operating context due to the earthquake and staff turnover, other key factors that have undermined effectiveness include inadequate strategic guidance due to a combination of the effects of the earthquake along with a lack of a Theory of Change, stakeholder map, and advocacy strategy for the program as a whole.

Interviews with communities and other stakeholders, supported by findings from the 2011 mid-term evaluation, indicate that there was broad consultation when formulating the strategy.

²⁵ Micro-Insurance Catastrophe Risk models are in use in Haiti http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/industries/financial+markets/retail+finance/insurance/micro

²⁶ MUSOs could potentially use learning from LWF’s successful projects COOP CAB coffee cooperatives – see Root Capital (2013).

²⁷ Responsibility for implementation was with the Réseau National pour la Défense des Droits Humains / National Human Rights Defence Network (RNDDH) <http://rnddh.org/en/>

One of the main gaps identified during the current evaluation is the lack of a long-term strategy with clear objectives and measurable benchmarks at a community level, even though a stated objective in LWF Haiti's strategy was to develop:

"...a curriculum for each group... according to the specific needs for the six years period with a first evaluation by the end of the third year. The monitoring of this empowerment will start after the first year with clear indicators defined with the curricula and our goal with that approach is to "graduate" communities after 6 years and move on to others." (page 10)

Findings suggest that this remains an appropriate goal to achieve reasonable outcomes and ensure sustainability.

Accountability to Communities

LWF-DWS was certified at the beginning of 2012 against the 2010 HAP standard. Even though the HAP team only visited one Country Program (Nepal), there are indications that LWF-DWS HQ have been quite active in rolling out their accountability framework and ensuring that there is a HAP accountability focal point appointed within each Country Program and they have a good understanding of their role. LWF Haiti staff appeared generally aware of the commitments in the Accountability Framework. The same could not be said for partners who, as with LWF Haiti's strategy, had never seen LWF's Accountability Framework, although it should be noted that the design of the projects they were implementing appeared to meet all relevant benchmarks, including complaints systems, etc.

LWF Haiti staff themselves are themselves questioning whether the systems are actually functioning as, during the past two years, there has been only one complaint (from a LWF staff member). This may signify that ongoing monitoring and consultation mechanisms are adequately addressing complaints, but it could equally signify lack of trust in the system. Observations by the team during field visits however did not show any sign of a lack of trust in the system given the evidently good relations between communities, LWF and their partners. Rather, the evaluators' assessments was that, even though complaints systems are in place, such approaches to complaints mechanisms tend to function better in relief contexts²⁸ or where there are "whistleblower" type problems of a serious nature that, most often due to the implication of a staff member, cannot be addressed through normal consultation mechanisms (e.g. sexual harassment, fraud, etc.). While complaints systems may be "on standby", the lack of a link between the complaints and monitoring systems is seen as a missed opportunity since in well-functioning "complaints" systems a considerable amount of feedback arrives in the form of

²⁸ See Transparency International (2011) "Good Practice in Community Complaints Mechanisms" http://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Complaint_mechanisms.pdf where all the examples are from humanitarian contexts. The Team Leader had reviewed three other LWF Country Programs during the past four months and observed that complaints mechanisms tend to be little used by communities apart from during relief operations. For example, LWF Ethiopia saw a surge in complaints during a food distribution since many were missing from registration lists.

constructive criticism (to improve implementation) and even validations (expressions of appreciation).²⁹

Inter-Agency Coordination

Based on interviews with external stakeholders, LWF Haiti has a reputation as a reliable NGO that does good quality work but few know what LWF actually does. With the exception of the model village in Gressier, which virtually all external key informants had either heard of (or in some cases visited themselves) LWF's work is really only well-understood and appreciated at a community level in areas where LWF has been working. This includes a good understanding and generally positive impression amongst community members who are not directly targeted by LWF activities such as MUSO.³⁰ In contrast, the general perception of external key informants at a national level is that although they generally had a positive impression of LWF Haiti's work, they were unable to describe what kind of work they do. This included government officials tasked with coordinating NGO activities who claimed they were not receiving LWF reports.

The main coordination forums relevant to international NGOs in Haiti are:

- **Cadre de Liaison Inter-ONG (CLIO)**,³¹ with 46 international and national NGO members was established before the earthquake and focuses mainly on development activities and works in French or Creole. LWF joined CLIO in 2011, and currently is a member of their Executive Committee.
- **NGO Coordination Committee, or Comité de Coordination des ONG (CCO)**,³² was set up in the aftermath of the earthquake and counts 44 international NGOs as members, including large INGOs. LWF is a member of the Steering Committee.
- **Humanitarian Clusters:** similar to the CCO, clusters in Haiti have been dominated by international agencies (UN and large INGOs) with English as the dominant working language and have, with few exceptions, viewed as marginalizing national actors.³³ Clusters initiated a transition process in 2012

²⁹ See, for example, Bainbridge, D. (2011) Community feedback and complaints mechanisms: early lessons from Tearfund's experience. <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-52/community-feedback-and-complaints-mechanisms-early-lessons-from-tearfund-experience>

³⁰ The criticism occasionally heard from non-beneficiaries was that LWF projects always required counterpart contributions and thus did not really target the poorest people.

³¹ <http://www.cliohaiti.org/index.php?page=presentation&PHPSESSID=d12bf281be289e2d17444e6694625db3>

³² <http://www.ccoayiti.org/about-us.html>

³³ Binder, A. and F. Grünwald (2010) IASC Cluster Approach Evaluation, Country Study – Haiti 2nd Phase <http://www.alnap.org/resource/5949>

that attempted to devolve leadership of humanitarian coordination efforts from internationally led clusters to national authorities – with mixed success.³⁴

- **Various “Tables Sectorielles”** and sectoral sub-working groups at national and regional levels to coordinate development activities are being given a higher profile as humanitarian activities diminish.

Based on interviews with coordinators and members of these different groups, LWF irregularly participates (except for national level “Tables Sectorielles”) but hasn’t, until recently, taken a lead role in any national forums. LWF Haiti has reportedly become more active during the past few months in both the CCO Steering Committee and CLIO’s Executive Committee and LWF Haiti’s representative on the committee was credited with playing a pivotal role in finally bringing the two main NGO forums (CLIO and CCO) together to agree on a joint position paper on the Haitian government’s proposed so-called “NGO law”.³⁵ LWF’s brokering role in this process was clearly appreciated. While there appears to be general agreement amongst NGOs in Haiti that the unregulated chaos seen following the earthquake needs to be addressed, the initial draft law was viewed as too restrictive. LWF’s role in agreeing on a joint position paper (rather than two different versions) was viewed as critical in facilitating a constructive dialogue amongst stakeholders.

The evaluation team did not find evidence that LWF Haiti participates regularly in national level forums, although there are indications that LWF (often wearing a dual LWF/ACT Alliance “hat”) is quite active - and very influential – at a regional level in areas where they are operating. Examples of this can be seen with their role in the 2012 Roundtable on Climate Change and DRR in the Grand’Anse that was jointly hosted by FNGA and LWF/ACT. The model village also offers a good illustration of the good quality of LWF Haiti’s coordination with local authorities. Not only does the Mayor’s office acknowledge responsibility for the community by, for example, helping to set up solid waste disposal systems but, when ownership of the land was challenged by individuals during 2013 government authorities were instrumental in resolving conflicts.

LWF Haiti also plays very important role within the ACT Alliance in Haiti. As the member of the Alliance with the most operational capacity, it was not only the largest recipient of Appeal funds (over US\$ 12.5 million - 36% of the total allocation), but LWF’s office provided a base of operations for most of the other Alliance members during the earthquake response. An independent evaluation of the ACT Alliance found that LWF’s role during the initial phase was a key factor in developing a strong and coherent structure for the Alliance’s earthquake response and recovery operations.³⁶

³⁴ Humanitarian Action Plan for Haiti 2014 <http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/humanitarian-action-plan-haiti-2014>

³⁵ Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe - UNAONG (2013) Projet de Loi – Cadre Fixant le Statut General des Associations en Haïti

³⁶ McGarty, S. et al. (2012) An Independent Final Evaluation of the Action of Churches Together Alliance Haiti Appeal HTI-101 (Jan 2010 - Dec 2011)

Effectiveness of a Partnership Approach

The transition process of handing over implementation responsibilities has had mixed results. As with many activities during this period, the transition was challenged by the changes forced by the earthquake that, among other things, caused a significant drop in funding and other forms of support to development activities. LWF decided to phase down operations (including closing the LWF office in Thiotte) and ended their partnership with CODAB. This was balanced by the transition of relief activities in the Palmes area into longer-term interventions together with RODEP.

Communities interviewed associate the transition period with a reduction in activities after LWF's handover of implementation responsibilities to local partners. This can be partly attributed to the reduction in funding so that planned activities did not take place.³⁷ However, observations indicate that a combination of partner capacities and lack of a shared understanding of project objectives³⁸ also played a role. A capacity building assessment was carried out during 2013 by FNGA and other self-assessments for partners are planned during early 2014. However, but there is not yet a capacity development plan for partners and, as a result, capacity building has tended to be *ad hoc*.

Cross-Cutting Issues

LWF Haiti's strategy prioritizes three cross-cutting themes; gender, the environment and rights based approaches. LWF Haiti's approach to each theme is described below. Psychosocial support was not specifically mentioned in the strategy, but became a very important activity area for LWF following the earthquake. Gender, Psychosocial and Human Rights are under the responsibility of a single focal point in LWF Haiti. There are no specific focal points for the environment either amongst LWF or their partner staff.

Gender

Gender equity was a key focus in the strategy and the development of LWF Haiti gender strategy finalized in November 2013 represents an important milestone in realizing objectives in the strategy. LWF took a very practical approach to developing this strategy, looking at gender issues from perspectives of different project activities that should facilitate the operationalization of the strategy.

The strategy is reflected in human resource management through gender equity approaches to conditions and benefits and relevant clauses are included in contracts signed by newly recruited staff. At a programmatic level, as illustrated by the approach LWF took when developing their gender strategy, emphasis on promoting equitable participation which in the Haitian context means identifying ways to

³⁷ An example given by community leaders in Macaya was that resources allocated were only sufficient for an introductory course of literacy training, which meant that women who had participated could write their name but do little else.

³⁸ This also manifested itself at a community level, where there was no evidence of community development plans.

increase women's involvement as illustrated by the extract below from an LWF report:

*"When the women of the community commented on the project plans, they proposed an alternative route than the one originally proposed by LWF partner RODEP, to make sure the new road passed by the local market, where many women sell their products in the early morning hours. LWF and RODEP adapted the plan accordingly."*³⁹

Women in fact outnumber men as beneficiaries in the MUSO projects by a ratio of more than 2:1. However, women only represent 25% of community leadership positions in LWF-supported projects. Proportions are less in executive positions with women usually occupying secretary, treasurer or adviser positions. There are reported to be only two committees where woman have been elected to higher positions (Vice Coordinators).

Environment

LWF Haiti's strategy emphasizes that *"environmental degradation is seen as one of the major threats to the future of the country and is the single biggest known risk for all development"*⁴⁰ and, together with a focus on livelihoods, has made this cross-cutting issue a cornerstone of their program. The proposed approach takes its direction from Haiti's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IMF 2008) of promoting sustainable livelihoods and environmental protection.

Findings from this evaluation indicate that LWF Haiti has been relatively successful at meeting its objectives for sustainable livelihoods at a community level, but there is little evidence for effectiveness in increasing environmental protection. Deficiencies in environment are due to several factors, including lack of technical capacity and/or someone in LWF with focal point responsibilities, lack of engagement in environmental forums⁴¹, and – beyond awareness raising and limited amounts of reforestation activities – there is relatively little promotion of advocacy within communities⁴². This situation has probably resulted in a number of missed opportunities, both in terms of funding, benefits from collaborating with environmental groups and with other ACT Alliance members.⁴³

³⁹ 2012 LWF Haiti Annual Report (page 24)

⁴⁰ Page 5

⁴¹ The Ministry of Environment recently established a "table sectorielle" for the environment. Three meetings had been held by the time the field visit for this evaluation had taken place where NGOs had participated. LWF had so far not participated in any of these table sectorielle.

⁴² None of those interviewed, whether staff from LWF, partner staff or community leaders in the Macaya and Foret de Pins areas knew what the current status of the forests was and whether forest destruction was increasing or decreasing.

⁴³ For example, UMCOR has recently piloted an environment curriculum manual in schools which LWF could potentially help in rolling out.

Psychosocial

Haiti's status as a fragile state has contributed to relatively high prevalence of psychosocial issues. The importance of this component of the strategy grew even more following the earthquake, particularly amongst displaced populations.⁴⁴ Psychosocial support did not feature as a specific cross-cutting issue in LWF Haiti's strategy but, similar to many other NGOs working in Haiti, LWF established a psychosocial cell and started integrating psychosocial support in their different emergency interventions. Although LWF Haiti's strategy did not, at least on paper, provide guidance the prominence given to psychosocial issues in the strategies of some of the Related Agencies, notably the Church of Sweden, who provided critical support to LWF in the form of training, tools and funding. This is a good example of the value added of the ACT Alliance.

Human Rights

LWF's strategy takes as a starting point Haiti's legal framework that, as described above, largely meets international norms. LWF's objectives are to guide and support efforts of communities to claim their rights, recognizing that objectives have to be realistic within the context. The strategy also acknowledges LWF's role in advocating for the rights of the poorest and their economic, social and cultural rights at a global level.

As described for other components of LWF's operations, findings indicate that LWF has been effective at a community and regional level, where there is evidence of solid outcomes, but outcomes are much less evident at national or global levels. Interviews with community leaders, MUSO and local DRR committee members indicate a good level of organization and awareness of roles and responsibilities towards communities they represent. Interviews with local authorities indicated that LWF and their partners have been effective at facilitating direct links between communities and local authorities to improve levels of services ranging from waste disposal arrangements in the Model Village to integration of local DRR committees in contingency plans in the Grand'Anse. In addition to the economic role played by MUSOs, they are also being used as a vehicle for raising awareness about women's rights, children's rights, and disaster and risk management.

LWF Haiti had originally planned to build the capacity of LWF staff to engage more effectively in human rights advocacy with the benefit of training from RNDDH. However, the partnership didn't function well due to a combination of difficulties in coordinating schedules, staff turnover, and other issues and the training has been rescheduled in 2014.

Collaboration & Coordination

LWF Haiti's collaboration and coordination have been reasonably effective, but the lack of a stakeholder map that is linked to a Theory of Change means that its

⁴⁴ Elizabeth Ferris and Sara Ferro-Ribeiro (2012) Protecting people in cities: the disturbing case of Haiti

interagency coordination tends to be *ad hoc*, particularly at a national level where coordination is quite “noisy” due to the multitude of actors and agendas. The lack of engagement in environment has probably led to missed opportunities in terms of funding, partnerships and influence that have made it more difficult to reach strategic goals, particularly for environmental protection.

Effectiveness – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

LWF has been mainly effective at a community and regional level, where there is evidence of solid outcomes, but less effective at national and global levels. From a rights-based perspective, it was found that LWF’s work has tended to focus on empowering right-holders with less attention given to influencing duty-bearers, at least at a national and global level. Effectiveness was also hampered by lack of the Theory of Change to help prioritize and link activities, especially since the strategy was not adapted to the changed operating environment. As a result, the vast majority of LWF Haiti’s resources and operational capacities were devoted to activities outside the scope of the strategy.

Efficiency

The strategy envisaged that feedback from LWF Haiti’s audit, monitoring and evaluation processes would help to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of LWF operations using a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators. As described in more detail in the Outcome section below, this system has not been functioning as originally envisaged although some improvements have been made since 2011 when following up on relevant recommendations. Apart from gaps in monitoring, evaluation and information management systems, it was also noted that community complaints systems was not integrated with monitoring and evaluation as described elsewhere in this report.

A related challenge⁴⁵ that was observed to affect efficiency is the information management system used by LWF and partners that make it difficult to easily access or synthesize needed information. Problems are not only related to data management, but also the formats in current used by LWF globally, and LWF-DWS is in the process of revising these as part of a global PMER revision process.

Is the Program Efficient?

The 2011 Mid-Term found that LWF Haiti’s program efficiency was low for several critical reasons. The table below compares efficiency findings of the mid-term and final evaluations.

⁴⁵ As described in the “Limitations and Constraints” section, this aspect was also a challenge for the evaluation team.

Table 2 Comparison of Efficiency Findings: Mid-Term and Final Evaluations

2011 Mid-Term Evaluation	Current Status	2014 Final Evaluation
Overly high staff turnover at all levels.	Somewhat improved	The Country Representative has been in post for over a year after an extended period of short-term deployments. Many key informants saw this as a positive development. On the other hand, there have been three restructuring exercises during the past two years that resulted in a 70% reduction in staffing and a broad sentiment amongst staff of being overworked.
At least five months of inactivity in 2011 due to fund release delays leading to cancelling all the dry season and most disaster reduction activities amongst others.	Improved in 2014	Delays in releasing funds caused similar problems for 2012 and 2013
Procurement and other procedures are still slow (two to four week turnaround time) and at times ineffective (such as poor quality materials delivered).	Not highlighted as a particular issue	This finding was linked to the emergency response, which the current evaluation could not assess. Improvements will only be seen during the next response.
There is no office-wide “shared drive” for information sharing and no systematic back-up policy and tools. This information sharing is limited leading to a concentration of knowledge with very few people.	No improvement	Information is still held by individuals and data is difficult to access.
We think that the use of staff skills and workloads is not optimized, of course this is difficult to do with the high turnover. However there might be opportunities to spread workloads better and increase capacity redundancy.	Still could be improved	Although staffing levels are 30% of what they were two years ago, there has not been a comprehensive review of systems to adapt the new structure to strategic priorities.

2011 Mid-Term Evaluation	Current Status	2014 Final Evaluation
Poor in-time planning leading to not respecting critical deadlines, especially for budgeting.	Not highlighted as an issue during interviews	
Insufficient capacity redundancy and delegation of responsibility. There is a tendency to centralize information and authority to the PaP office,	Some improvement	This has improved for LWF since almost all of their field offices have now been closed down. For partners this remains something of an issue, although LWF staff do regularly visit partners and project sites.

At the same time there are a number of elements of LWF Haiti program that contribute to the efficiency of interventions, notably the relatively high level of community participation in terms of both financial and in-kind contributions. The transition of implementation responsibilities to partners while reducing LWF staff has lowered costs although, as described in the Effectiveness section above, capacity gaps in partners suggest that this is not yet as cost-effective as anticipated.


When looking at the main cost drivers of the program during the period covered by the strategy, relief and recovery operations stand out, since they account for nearly 70% of the total budget during the strategy period. The Model Village is the single largest cost driver, which by itself accounts for some 15 % of the total budget. This is a significant investment that which makes it critical that, for example, a sustainable solution to the water supply problem is identified.⁴⁶

Comparative cost studies have been carried out in Haiti for transitional shelters (so-called T-shelters) that formed the core of most NGO shelter programs, but no such study for permanent housing could be found. Based on budget figures for 2012, when 3.4 million Euros (69% of LWF's total 2012 budget) was devoted to construction of earthquake proof housing for 180 families, this provides per unit cost per family of approximately 18,800 Euros (around US\$ 25,800) per house.⁴⁷ Technical assessments of finished constructions have been overall positive. As shown below, unit costs for Model Village houses compares favorably with USAID-funded permanent house constructions (more than \$33,000 each) where cost-effectiveness was further reduced in some areas because of sustainability problems.

⁴⁶ Unfortunately, the water supply problem has been aggravated by the choice of sanitary systems (flush toilets) that consume significant amounts of water.

⁴⁷ The cost to the project can be reduced by the beneficiary's contribution of \$1,034 giving a net unit cost of around \$24,000.

Figure 7 USAID Cost Estimates Permanent House Construction⁴⁸



Risk Management

LWF uses a risk management matrix as an integral part of the project development process, but LWF's good relationships with communities and local authorities are a key component of their risk management approach. The Model Village, which was the main single investment during the strategy period, offers an example of LWF's approach to risk management.

When planning and implementing the project, LWF staff regularly consulted with surrounding communities, other NGOs, local government authorities and sought advice from legal advisors and technical consultants to help ensure the quality of the finished project and that conflicts did not escalate over land ownership issues, something which is very common in Haiti. If risks had not been effectively managed with such a high profile investment, LWF would have run considerable reputational risks and contributed to increased social tensions in the area instead of reducing vulnerability. When a few individuals did challenge land ownership, local authorities and community members lent support ensuring that the construction was not disrupted. LWF also supported the establishment of MUSO groups in neighbouring communities, thus mitigating against any jealousies that might arise.

The risk assessment for the Model Village focused on psychosocial, political and environmental (solid) waste components and there is no mention of the lack of water, which has come to become the single most significant threat to the sustainability of the model village. Had this been identified as a risk earlier, it could

⁴⁸ Government Accounting Office (2013) Haiti Reconstruction: USAID Projects have had Mixed Results and Face Sustainability Challenges. Testimony before the House of Representatives Foreign Relations Committee – October 2013 (page 14)

have been mitigated during the design phase through, for example, identification of alternative sites where water availability was better and use of sanitary systems that consume less water.

Efficiency – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

LWF Haiti has made progress in addressing inefficiencies identified in the 2011 mid-term evaluation, but some remain unaddressed (an example being the “learning loop” envisaged for the PMER system). The main cost drivers during the period covered by strategy have been relief and recovery operations, with the Model Village being the single largest investment during the strategy, making it crucial for LWF to both ensure its sustainability and capture/share learning from this experience. Operational efficiency was also affected by frequent staff turnover and restructuring and support systems were not necessarily adapted to the new configurations. There were also long delays in transferring funds to partners at the beginning of each calendar year, although LWF has rectified this problem in 2014.

Measurement of Outcomes and Impact

The strategy envisaged that LWF Haiti’s planning, monitoring and evaluation system would be a contextualized version of the global LWF/DWS model. Monitoring and evaluation would be done at three levels:

- Empowerment: monitoring of project outcomes at the local-level;
- Monitoring of inputs and outputs related to project activities; and
- Qualitative and quantitative process and outcome monitoring undertaken by external consultants.

It was also envisaged that periodic reviews would provide opportunities for feedback and analysis of program trends:

- Internal program audit (assessment of implementation and impact of specific program components) as well as mandatory external financial audits.
- Regular field visits and review meetings conducted by program staff, donor partners and other staff.
- Regular meetings local with partners.
- Annual participative internal evaluations at the implementing partner level to facilitate planning to review lessons learned and plan the next phase.

Findings from this evaluation reflect findings from the Mid-Term Evaluation, i.e. that LWF Haiti’s program continues to be handicapped by weaknesses in quality and accountability management. LWF Haiti has nonetheless taken some positive steps to follow up on some of the recommendations from that evaluation. Whereas the Mid-Term Evaluation remarked upon the complete absence of baseline information, there are now baselines for a handful of projects being used for monitoring. A monitoring and evaluation position was created in 2011, although it was

subsequently cut during a restructuring exercise a year later to accommodate a budget reduction.

LWF has also been regularly carrying out household level surveys to capture qualitative outcomes through perceptions. For example, a 2011 report for Macaya reviewed showed over 80% of respondents reporting an increase of income of 15% at the end of the 2011 project⁴⁹; the target set for the project. Nevertheless, this is based solely on responses of community members to questions and is not validated using other types of indicators or methodologies. Based on our discussions with partners and LWF staff, a reliance mainly on these types of qualitative household surveys appeared to be the norm.

The completed projects that the team was able to observe together with feedback from communities and the evidently good working relationships between communities, partners and LWF Haiti did not give the evaluation team reason to doubt the credibility of data in the reports. However, a more robust monitoring and evaluation system that encourages greater participation and at the same time collects data that can be triangulated is an area where an international NGO such as LWF should add value. Partners expressed interest in improving performance measurement systems and FNGA already took the initiative to conduct a post-distribution survey of their pig distribution project. The results are useful, but they admit that there is room for to improve the methodology; which is an area where LWF Haiti should be able add value.⁵⁰

Has LWF Made a Difference in Haiti?

Despite gaps in measurement systems, it is possible to observe evidence of positive impact of LWF Haiti's activities, whether in the form of the model village where people feel their lives have transformed, MUSO groups that are actively contributing their own resources and understand their roles as community leaders. During the visit to Thiotte, the evaluation team took the opportunity of meeting with the current President of COOP CAB, a coffee cooperative that LWF had helped establish during the 1990s. Five years after LWF had withdrawn their support, COOP CAB is still functioning with a membership of several thousand and an annual budget of around US\$250,000, of which 10% is allocated for social activities such as public health awareness training. A recent study⁵¹ has documented the COOP CAB experience and LWF Haiti should be able to some relevant lessons from this experience to improve impacts in their current program.

Outcome and Impact Measurement – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

LWF has improved its PMER systems since the 2011 mid-term evaluation, notably in terms of compiling baseline information. Nevertheless, with little exception, the

⁴⁹ LWF Haiti (2012) End of Project Report - Sustainable Livelihood in Environmentally Critical Areas 2009 – 2012

⁵⁰ LWF-DWS in Geneva is currently leading a revision of their global Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting system with a specific focus on improving measurement and reporting on outcomes.

⁵¹ Root Capital (2013)

evidence of outcomes and impact of LWF's work is largely anecdotal. There is a need to improve measurement and communication of outcomes/impact, though it should be noted that this is not only a problem faced by LWF Haiti. It has been recognized as a challenge by international agencies globally and LWF-DWS' current focus on strengthening their global PMER systems should provide useful support for LWF Haiti.

Sustainability

LWF Haiti's strategy puts a high priority on participation of and ownership by communities during the complete project cycle and mitigating against dependency. Promoting participation by women's participation and management of potential risks are seen as key elements in ensuring sustainability.

Observations and interviews during this evaluation confirmed LWF Haiti has achieved a high standard of participation with communities, a standard that is also mirrored by its partners. This emphasis on participation, along with a consistent approach in their development programs to require a contribution from beneficiaries, provides a solid basis for sustainable interventions and, as illustrated by the experience of COOP CAB referred to above, LWF has shown itself capable of supporting high impact sustainable interventions.

While participation is certainly a strong point, this did not necessarily translate into complete transparency. None of the partners interviewed had ever seen LWF Haiti's strategy and they had only seen budgets that directly concerned their own projects; they were unaware of what resources were available for the overall program. None of the communities interviewed had seen either the LWF strategy or budgets. Exit strategies have been developed as part of the project design although not necessarily always implemented as planned. In the Thiotte area, for example, the decision to close down the LWF office and cease operations with the local partner (CODAB) was relatively sudden and one of the results is that a recently-constructed training center remains empty and unused. The Model Village provides another kind of example of a project which has needed to be supported longer than planned and an additional budget of 800,000 Euros has been foreseen to reinforce sustainability between April 2013 to end of 2014. Non-respect of key Sphere minimum standards for IDP resettlement when choosing a site for the Model Village also compromised sustainability.⁵²

As described above, the team did not find any evidence of multi-year community plans linked to a Theory of Change with measurable benchmarks (as foreseen in the strategy). The team's judgment was that these could have been helpful in promoting sustainability and to guide exit strategies.

⁵² Sphere Guidance Note No. 9 – service provision should meet minimum standards (page 253) in Minimum Standards in Shelter, Settlement and Non-Food Items Chapter. WASH standard 1 (page 89) “WASH needs of the affected population are met and users are involved in the design, management and maintenance of the facilities”.

What Other Sources of Funds may be Available?

The Terms of Reference also requested an assessment of other sources of funding that LWF Haiti could potentially avail of in order to diversify its funding base and help to ensure that it could sustain an appropriate level of activities in Haiti.

Interviews with peer NGOs and donor representatives indicated that in the post emergency phase there are various funding streams either directly from bilateral donors, private foundations or via UN agencies that have been made available to NGOs, both national and international, to sustain recovery efforts and promote development. Recent examples of funding made available in sectors where LWF has been working include livelihoods, food security, DRR⁵³, environmental protection⁵⁴ with a number of grants being accorded to consortia.

While international NGOs continue to receive funds, findings suggest that international NGOs should expect to be continually challenged to clearly demonstrate their value added in the Haitian context, notably in terms of quality assurance and capacity building of national capacities. A quote from a 2013 evaluation commissioned by ECHO sums up the current perspective in Haiti for NGOs:

“SWOT analysis of the current system shows key strengths from both INGOs (quality assurance, financial and technical support, principles, etc.) and LNGOs (access, participation, sustainability, resilience), but also respective weaknesses (some poor cost-effectiveness of INGOs, weak finances and management skills by LNGOs).”⁵⁵

The key recommendation made to ECHO, which appears to resonate with LWF Haiti’s operating model, was that:

“...ECHO should better acknowledge the complementarity of the respective strengths and weaknesses of INGOs and LNGOs in delivering humanitarian aid with due efficiency and effectiveness. There is a large “in-between” area that needs to be streamlined. The role of LNGOs, who are often not sufficiently visible although they implement near to 100% of project activities, should be made more transparent for the sake of accountability. In parallel, the crucial capacity building and guidance provided to LNGOs by many international actors through their Partnership policies should also be better recognised and supported by ECHO.”⁵⁶

⁵³ Review of three Programmes for Natural Resource Management and Disaster Risk Reduction in Haiti <http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-reports/publication?key=406210>

⁵⁴ UNEP Haiti <http://www.unep.org/disastersandconflicts/CountryOperations/Haiti/UNEPinHaiti/tabid/104693/Default.aspx>

⁵⁵ http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2013/LNGO_Evaluation.pdf (Page 12)

⁵⁶ Ibid (page 9)

This is an approach that is visible in public communications campaigns by agencies such as Oxfam.⁵⁷

Sustainability – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

A key feature that helps to ensure the sustainability of LWF Haiti’s interventions is the emphasis on the participatory approach with both partners and communities. LWF Haiti’s capacity and learning from prior experience (e.g. coffee cooperatives in eastern Haiti) positions them well to continue to improve through, for example, developing multi-year community plans and capacity building plans for partners with measurable benchmarks (as originally foreseen in the strategy) to help define sustainable exit strategies.

Emergency Preparedness & DRR

The strategic objective for this component, which was drafted prior to the earthquake, was that emergencies will be part of the LWF Haiti focus when needs arise but will be seen in the LRRD continuum with an emphasis on early recovery. Coordinating would take place with the National ACT Forum where appropriate and the LWF Haiti program could be mobilized for relief operations.

The assessment of LWF Haiti’s role by the 2011 ACT Alliance evaluation confirms that this strategic objective was implemented exactly as planned in the aftermath of the earthquake. As described in the coordination section above, LWF Haiti played a key role in the response by the ACT Alliance, providing the main base of operations for a number of members along with the bulk of the operational capacity.

Following the earthquake LWF Haiti worked in the urban Petion-ville area of Port-au-Prince and in affected rural communes of Gressier, Leogane, Grand Goave and Petit Goave. provided relief supplies including NFIs (jerry cans, plastic sheeting, hygiene kits, kitchen kits, and blankets), food distribution, latrine and WASH facilities and water supplies. LWF also provided immediate and longer term recovery support to families in its operational areas in Thiotte and Macaya hosting IDPs with livelihood relief support including cash for work, seeds and tools. Relief operations provided an entry point for LRRD operations in Gressier (Model Village), Palmes (MUSO and other development activities) as well as in areas where LWF was already operating:

“In the response to the earthquake emergency, LWF looked for ways to effectively respond to the needs of the population affected by the crisis, but keeping in line with its long term intervention in the country that focuses particularly on sustainable livelihoods, environmental protection and disaster preparedness. Therefore, three sectors were identified as key sectors of intervention for this project: livelihoods, shelter and education. These were chosen by taking into consideration the prioritization of the needs of the affected population, the gaps in

⁵⁷ Owning the future: Haitians taking the lead in reconstruction
<http://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressrelease/2014-01-11/owning-future-haitians-taking-lead-reconstruction>

the response by other actors, and the link to the long term LWF work in the development program.

Some examples of this approach can be seen in the work undertaken through cash for work. Eight nurseries have been developed in Palmes and Bino and 15,000 trees have been planted on embankments. Seventy members of local communities in Tete a Boeuf have received training in road rehabilitation and in Palmes 35 people have received training in rehabilitation of a school.”⁵⁸

At the same time, it is clear that LWF Haiti faced considerable challenges during operations in terms of logistics, staff turnover, procurement bottlenecks, to name but a few. In contrast The 2011 Mid-Term Evaluation found that the disaster component was being addressed on an ad hoc-basis and was not well-connected to the longer-term interventions. Findings from the current evaluation indicated that this gap is being addressed, based on capacity assessments of community-based DRR committees and links with local authorities in operational areas.

The evaluation also found LWF is currently well prepared for emergencies and capable to provide a suitable response, with dedicated stock, logistical resources and trained staff, while warning that capacity was likely to diminish in 2012 unless investment could be found to maintain it. Based on findings during the current evaluation, the emergency infrastructure and standby capacity in Leogane is likely to play a key role in future emergency responses.

Emergency Preparedness & DRR – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

The earthquake highlighted one of LWF’S main “value-added” in the Haiti context; hands-on support to relief and recovery operations following a large disaster event. Haiti stands out in the region in a number of ways, including its fragile state status, comparatively low national response capacity, high levels of vulnerability, different language and culture. In the Haiti context, findings indicate that LWF’s integration of DRR with development/environment protection activities is an appropriate strategy. The emergency infrastructure and standby capacity is likely to play a key support role during future emergency responses, not just for LWF Haiti, but for other ACT Alliance members.

Partnership

LWF’s strategy envisaged forming or strengthening strategic alliances with a range of Haitian stakeholders and, at a global level, with Related Agencies who have long-term commitments to Haiti. As part of its partnership objectives, LWF Haiti also planned to diversify its funding base with new strategic partners. A summary of findings from the evaluation assessing the status of strategic partnerships is below.

⁵⁸ ACT evaluation page 50

Table 3 Progress towards Strategic Partnership Objectives

Groups targeted by LWF Haiti's Strategy	Objective Achieved?	Remarks
Local partners working in Macaya and Foret des Pins	Achieved	Additional partner (RODEP) added in Palmes following the earthquake
Other NGOs and government agencies that support LWF's areas of work or have thematic expertise or coordinating functions such as the Ministère de l'Environnement et Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire	Achieved at a regional level but not at a national level	LWF is seen as a capable and trusted partner at municipality and regional level, but little evidence of strategic partnerships at a national level.
Haitian authorities responsible for coordination (Ministry of Planning and in emergencies the Direction de la Protection Civile)	Achieved at a regional level but not at a national level	As above.
Engagement with coalitions of national and international NGOs (e.g. CLIO) and local churches.	Partially achieved	LWF viewed as a relatively passive participant until started assuming leading roles towards the end of 2013
ACT Haiti Forum	Achieved	LWF played a leading role during the earthquake response and continues to be seen as a key partner.
UN agencies (OCHA, UNDP) and the Comite Permanent Inter-Organisations (CPIO).	Not Achieved	Little evidence of strategic partnerships. Notable absence of UNEP in the list.
Related Agencies (at a global level)	Achieved	ACT earthquake response strengthened partnership. Development activities challenged by need to show LWF's value-added.
New donors to diversify funding	Not Achieved	Little evidence of strategic partnerships being formed with new donors.

LWF Haiti's strategy targets poor communities, rather than individuals, using an approach that promotes ownership through active participation, including financial contributions. Observations and interviews in beneficiary communities indicated that poorest community members benefit from community-based assistance (such as community water supplies) but, with the exception of relief assistance, do not usually directly benefit from LWF assistance targeted at individuals. Findings indicated that the emphasis on contributions on the whole meets the objectives of

promoting ownership and sustainability. However, donors have different expectations and gaps in outcome measurement data makes it difficult to understand how LWF support is affecting the poorest sections of the communities.

Interviews with LWF's current partners in Haiti and observations of interactions in the field and during workshops confirm that these are genuine strategic relationships. Partners view the relationship as added value, not just in terms of funding, but also value capacity building opportunities. Their main areas for improvement highlighted by partners were the long delays in allocating funds at the beginning of each calendar year (though this issue appears to have been solved in 2014) and insufficient capacity building opportunities.

Under the current strategy, the progressive handover of implementation responsibilities to local partners was set as an objective, but did not fix specific capacity building targets and there is not yet such a plan in place. LWF has so far carried out a capacity assessment of one partner (FNGA) in 2012,⁵⁹ and the results appear to provide a useful basis from which to develop a Theory of Change for local partners.

The selection criteria originally used by LWF when selecting its partners was:

- *The organization has a vision of the world and the development of values and goals consistent with those of the LWF.*
- *The organization promotes the men / women in its staff and its governing bodies parity.*
- *The organization applies a principle of non-discrimination.*
- *Governance of the organization is done according to the principles of efficiency and quality.*
- *The organization is in full transparency (accountability).*
- *Decision-making structures of the organization are representative of the diversity of society and its members are appointed according to the democratic process.*
- *The hierarchical structure of the organization allows for quick decision-making.*

Findings from this evaluation indicate that, while these criteria remain valid on the whole, they could be further strengthened to promote a shared vision, mission and capacities are consistent with LWF's strategic priorities. Accountability criteria should be reviewed and revised in light of LWF's HAP certification.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Pierre, A. et al. (2012)

⁶⁰ For further details on implications for local partners of HAP certified agencies, see page 4 in Lewinsky, T. (2013) Linking accountability policy and practice with evidence: four thought pieces. HAP International. <http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/hap-synthesis-research-paper.pdf>

The Future of LWF Partnerships

Based on trends observed in the national government,⁶¹ priorities of donor on building national capacities along with persistent post-earthquake perceptions about the lack of accountability, pressure on international NGOs⁶² will only increase. To remain viable actors, international NGOs in Haiti will need to both be perceived as being transparent and accountable and show credibly how they add value by strengthening national capacities. This trend may be interrupted temporarily by future disaster events when local capacities are overwhelmed due to Haiti's relatively high vulnerability and low resilience.

The role of local partners in the LWF program is likely to increase due to combined pressures from donors and the Haitian government on using national capacities along with cost-effectiveness considerations. The lack of a shared Theory of Change for LWF and its partners based on objectives their respective strategic plans⁶³ will make it more difficult to demonstrate value added, clarify the respective roles and responsibilities between LWF and its partners, identify gaps that could be filled by new partners⁶⁴, guide prioritization of limited resources,⁶⁵ and develop coherent exit strategies⁶⁶.

LWF Partnerships – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

This strategy was a critical transition phase for LWF Haiti in terms of partnerships and it has met most of its objectives with local partners, local authorities, and related agencies. Findings suggest that LWF was correct in prioritizing these partnerships; if things had not worked here then the justification of LWF's continued presence in Haiti could be questioned. In contrast, LWF has made relatively little progress in forging strategic partnerships at higher levels that could increase influence and impact. Based on current trends, partnership – notably

⁶¹ Illustrated by the law currently being drafted by the Ministry of Planning designed to regulate NGO presence and activities.

⁶² Ramachandran V. and Walz J. (2013) Haiti's earthquake generated a \$9bn response – where did the money go? <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/haiti-earthquake-where-did-money-go>

⁶³ Of LWF's current local partners, only one (FNGA) has a long-term strategic plan themselves.

⁶⁴ For LWF's current strategy, such examples could be NGOs that specialize in environmental issues or micro-credit. The Theory of Change developed to support the next strategy would define gaps and prospective new partners.

⁶⁵ As in many capital cities in developing countries, it would not be difficult to fill up days just attending various meetings in Port au Prince. A Theory of Change should help to identify where and when resources (including people's time) should be invested.

⁶⁶ When LWF closed down their operations in Thiotte, findings suggest that there was not viable exit strategy in place. Among other things, this has resulted in a newly-constructed training centre remaining empty and unused despite a number of good examples in the surrounding area of sustainable interventions such as the COOP CAB coffee cooperative and a milk processing facility which were phased out during the previous strategic plan.

building of national capacities – is likely to be a key component of LWF Haiti’s next strategy.

Organizational Management

When the strategy was being developed during 2008 LWF was planning to restructure its program unit to end up with two project managers and one individual responsible for disaster preparedness/emergencies. Faced with financial constraints, this was viewed as the minimum human resources needed for the execution of a program if it was going to have an impact. Recruitment was viewed as a challenge as it was felt that LWF would be unable to provide competitive salaries compared to its peers. LWF Haiti’s program budget was projected to grow from US \$1.5 million (1.1 million Euros) during 2009 to US\$2 million (1.35 million Euros at 2008 rates of exchange) in 2014.

The main external risks identified were natural disasters related to climate change and environmental degradation along with a fragile political and social environment. Key internal risks were weak management systems caused by blurred lines of accountability, a lack of transparency in decision-making and changes in the organizational culture. It was proposed to address these risks with a new institutional development project targeting staff from LWF and its partners.

Subsequent events underline the importance of a continued focus in LWF’s strategy on DRR and reducing vulnerability in its longer term interventions along with the flexibility that allows LWF to ramp up a rapid emergency response that draws on appropriate human and financial resources from outside the country while using an approach that works with and through national actors as much as possible.

As described above, LWF has managed to adapt to a changed operating environment and, in the process, also strengthened its capacities and financial base. The 2011 mid-term evaluation also highlighted the exceptionally high levels of motivation and commitment displayed by LWF staff, something that the current evaluation team also observed almost 3 years later; despite a common perception amongst staff about regarding low salary levels.⁶⁷

One of the questions in the TOR for this evaluation was whether the overall structure was appropriate to the program, projects and supporting activities. Reviewing the scale and frequency of the many restructuring exercises by LWF Haiti since 2009 (and resulting the challenges), a more relevant question would be “*How well was LWF Haiti able to adapt its structure to rapidly changing operating environments?*”

Continuing good levels of morale and teamwork both within LWF and its local partners attests to the fact that LWF Haiti has coped with the many management challenges they have faced during this strategy period.

⁶⁷ Salary comparisons tended to be drawn with international NGOs and UN agencies. Based on data available to the evaluation team, salary rates for staff of national NGO partners are approximately half of those for LWF staff.

Interviews with LWF staff indicated that there is a widespread feeling that the three successive downsizing exercises during the past two years has resulted in excessive current workloads for many staff, even when taking into account reductions in project activities. Even though staffing levels are now some 30% in comparison to 2011 levels, there was no evidence that LWF had carried out a review of administrative systems to ensure they were adapted to new structures.

Donors interviewed generally have a good impression of LWF Haiti and trust them to do good work. A number of significant gaps⁶⁸ at a strategic level that have been highlighted in other sections of this report indicate that LWF Haiti currently lacks required capacity to meet a number of donor (especially back donor) expectations regarding value-added of international NGOs.

Adapting to a Changing Donor Environment

One of the targets in the strategy was to develop a fundraising plan taking into account the perspectives of the related agencies and the international community plans in Haiti such as USAID, EU and UN. It was unclear from available data whether any progress in developing a fundraising plan in the first year of the strategy before the earthquake struck. An influx of funding after the earthquake meant that LWF had to shift its priorities to ensuring that it had the absorptive capacity to utilize expanding budgets.

As funding availability and operations decreased, LWF put more emphasis on fundraising as funding for earthquake recovery operations tailed off and created a Liaison Officer position to assist with fundraising, proposal development and reporting. The evaluation team saw no evidence that a fundraising plan had been developed and there has not be any significant funding from new donors.⁶⁹ As shown in Figure 6, the projected budget for 2014 is the lowest annual budget since 2009, although the 2014 budget will probably increase during the year, particularly if Haiti experiences a serious disaster event.

Institutional Learning

As described above, feeding back the results of monitoring, review and evaluation activities to promote learning was a specific objective of the strategy. Capacity building of staff was also seen to be integral to LWF Haiti's program.

The 2011 mid-term evaluation found a number of gaps in learning loops, citing examples from infrastructure (*impluviums*) projects, new income-generating activities and seed improvement schemes. The evaluation also found there was a lack of experiential learning in MUSOs (no Farmer Field Schools, little networking, etc.).

⁶⁸ Examples include PMER systems that do not meet international standards, the lack of a coherent Theory of Change to support the strategy, lack of strategies and benchmarks for partner and community capacity building, influencing/advocacy at national and global levels.

⁶⁹ A proposal for 281,000 Euros submitted to ECHO to support DDR activities had not yet been approved at the time of the field visit.

Findings from the current evaluation indicated that LWF Haiti has made efforts to keep learning at the center of its work. LWF routinely includes capacity building activities in their proposals, but has been hampered in fulfilling related objectives because of competing priorities, gaps in PMER and information/knowledge management systems, and lack of resources (both financial and human). Using this evaluation as an example, instead of having the usual two hour debriefing for senior staff to validate provisional results, LWF management opted to integrate the debrief into a day long interactive workshop⁷⁰ involving LWF staff and partners that gave them an opportunity to review the Theory of Change and start developing action plans for recommendations that had been validated and prioritized.

In addition to the gaps cited above, experiential learning gaps cited in the mid-term evaluation do not seem to have been addressed. LWF and partners have done a considerable amount of capacity building with community groups that have focused on reinforcing group solidarity, mutual accountability and awareness/respect for rights. As already described above, this approach has contributed to positive outcomes such as high repayment rates within microcredit groups and capable community leaders who are aware of their responsibilities to the people they represent. However, there are still gaps remaining in technical knowledge and advice and neither LWF nor partners currently appear to have expertise needed for technical support in areas such as environment, micro-credit or, since the last restructuring, engineering. Similar to the findings of the mid-term evaluation, although the MUSOs themselves were functioning well, it was not clear to the evaluators how LWF Haiti intends to develop and use networks to facilitate learning and reduce vulnerability (as LWF has successfully done with COOP CAB in eastern Haiti). This experiential learning, including introduction and contextualizing innovations⁷¹ from other countries is also one of those “value-added” that donors tend to expect.

Organizational Management – Assessment against Evaluation Criteria

LWF Haiti has coped relatively well with the strains of managing in rapidly changing, and often stressful, operating conditions and deserves credit for emerging from this experience with a team that remains motivated and committed to LWF Haiti’s vision and mission. It has adapted to rapidly changing operating environments by frequent restructuring. Evidence suggests that restructuring exercises have primarily been driven by project budgets while administrative systems, information management, and support to longer-term strategic goals were not necessarily suited to the new structure.

Capacity building has been successful at some levels, notably in the form of strong and committed leaders at a community level. The capacity building objectives set for LWF partners and staff (and communities) have nevertheless not been fully met, and this has implications for LWF’s continued value added given that capacity

⁷⁰ Workshop agenda, participant evaluations and working groups are attached as an Annex.

⁷¹ An example of an innovation that introduced by NGOs and adapted to the Haitian context is cash transfer systems.

building of national actors will almost certainly be a central focus in the next strategy.

Conclusions

Key conclusions below are presented based on the evaluation criteria in the TOR.

Relevance

The priorities chosen by LWF for Haiti remain as relevant at the end of the strategy as at the beginning, despite the “detour” needed to deal with the impact of the earthquake in January 2010. The strategy is also well-aligned with the LWF-DWS global strategy. LWF Haiti’s main challenges were in operationalization and demonstrating outcomes and tangible influence at national and global levels and the other is that most of their resources were prioritized to earthquake relief and recovery activities that were outside the original strategy.

Effectiveness

LWF has been mainly effective at a community and regional level, where there is evidence of solid outcomes, but less effective at national and global levels. Effectiveness was hampered by lack of the Theory of Change to help prioritize and link activities and a general lack of strategic guidance on how the earthquake response could link with and support the original strategy.

Efficiency

LWF Haiti has made some progress in addressing inefficiencies identified by the 2011 mid-term evaluation, although some issues remain. The main cost drivers during the strategy were those not directly covered by the strategy (relief and recovery after the earthquake). The largest single investment during the strategy has been the Model Village and, while implementation has been reasonably efficient, its sustainability (and ultimate cost-efficiency) is likely to be determined by a satisfactory solution to the water supply problem.

Outcome and Impact Measurement

LWF is improving its PMER systems since the 2011 mid-term evaluation, notably in terms of compiling baseline information. However, with few exceptions, most of the evidence of outcomes and impact of LWF’s work is largely anecdotal. This is likely to be an important area to focus on in future to enable LWF Haiti to demonstrate value-added.

Sustainability

An emphasis on participatory approaches is a cornerstone of the sustainability of LWF’s operations in Haiti. However, LWF has not developed multi-year community plans and capacity building plans for partners with measurable benchmarks as originally foreseen in the strategy.

Emergency Preparedness and DRR

The aftermath earthquake underlined one of LWF's main "value-added" in the Haiti context; hands-on support to relief and recovery operations following a large disaster event within the ACT Alliance. Findings indicate that LWF's integration of DRR with development/environment protection activities is an appropriate strategy and that continuing capacity and infrastructure for disaster response is likely to play a key support role during future emergency responses, not just for LWF Haiti, but for other ACT Alliance members.

Partnership

The current strategy saw LWF Haiti a transition in its development projects from direct implementation to working through local partners. The earthquake had an effect on the transition, and LWF emerged with strengthened relationships not only with its local partners but also several Related Agencies. In contrast, LWF has made relatively little progress in forging strategic partnerships at higher levels that could increase influence and impact.

Organizational Management

LWF Haiti has coped relatively well with the strains of managing in rapidly changing, and often stressful, operating conditions and deserves credit for emerging from this experience with a team that remains motivated and committed to LWF Haiti's vision and mission. The frequent restructuring has been mainly driven by project budgets while administrative systems, information management, and support to longer-term strategic goals were not necessarily suited to the new configuration.

LWF Haiti has made efforts to integrate capacity building into their projects and management systems that have yielded some positive results, most notably strong and committed community leaders. The capacity building objectives set for LWF partners and staff have not been fully met and this is likely to have implications for LWF's continued value added given that capacity building of national actors will almost certainly be a central focus in the next strategy.

Recommendations

Recommendations below are directed at four separate groups; LWF Haiti, LWF-DWS HQ (Geneva), LWF Haiti Partners and LWF Related Agencies operating in Haiti. These are sub-categorized in terms of timing into those that should be implemented prior to the end of the current strategy (by December 2014) and those to be considered when planning the next strategy.

Recommendations for LWF Haiti

Recommendations for the next 6-9 months (the final phase of the current strategy):

1. Develop a transition plan for the current strategy to the new strategy to smooth the transition and ensure adequate exit plans are in place for those activities that are closing.
2. Using results from the capacity building needs assessment for partners, develop capacity development strategies with suitable milestones to illustrate how partners will strengthen their program management, monitoring and governance while at the same time increasing sustainability (e.g. by decreasing dependence on LWF funding).
3. Strengthen planning, monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and learning systems including:
 - a. Improve information management systems by establishing more user-friendly systems and designate a focal point (and alternate focal point) for internal and external Information Management.
 - b. Systematize use of post-intervention monitoring to assess outcomes.
 - c. Ensure that monitoring and evaluation capacities within LWF and partners are fit for purpose (i.e. adapted to operational requirements).
 - d. Increase involvement of communities in the planning and monitoring of activities, including transforming the complaint system in to a " complaints AND feedback" system while channeling relevant feedback and suggestions into monitoring and evaluation systems.
4. Carry out a lessons-learned case study on the model village to capture and share relevant learning with the Shelter Center⁷² and others who could make use of this knowledge.
5. Clarify the Theory of Change⁷³ for the current strategy to better understand the outcomes expected from the current phase and to use as a foundation for

⁷² <http://www.sheltercentre.org/>

⁷³ See www.theoryofchange.org for practical guidance and examples.

developing a Theory of Change for the next strategy⁷⁴. The Theory of Change should emphasize a rights-based approach, analyzing and addressing strengths and weaknesses of both the Haitian communities and individuals as rights-holders and the duty bearers (government authorities, LWF staff) at different levels. The Theory of Change should provide guidance in terms of:

- a. Improve understanding of linkages between different levels (local, regional, national and global) to be able to define the responsibilities of duty-bearers, better measure outcomes and improve likelihood of greater impact.
 - b. Prioritization of collaboration and networking efforts (public sector, NGOs, donors) to better support communities and instill a better knowledge of LWF's work amongst external stakeholders⁷⁵.
 - c. Prioritize the roll out of the gender strategy within the program and develop indicators to measure progress (for example, promote more equitable representation of men and women in CBOs and MUSOs).
 - d. Nominate a focal point for the environment protection component of the strategy to help move this component towards strategic goals.
 - e. Gain better clarity of how other key cross-cutting issues, notably psycho-social support, fit within the strategy.
 - f. Build on LWF Haiti's existing and potential strengths to maximize value-added.
6. Diversify LWF's funding portfolio while at the same time seeking a "win-win" collaborative consortium approach together with key partners identified through a Theory of Change approach whereby the donor not only provides funding, but also supports LWF Haiti's strategic objectives through advocacy.⁷⁶
 7. Review and revise communication strategy based on LWF Haiti's stakeholder map to include, for example, more systematic reporting to government authorities and more effective communication with partners.
 8. Carry out a review of human resource capacity and systems to help fill capacity gaps and increase efficiency. A salary and benefits survey⁷⁷ would be a useful support to this process.
 9. Maintain a standby emergency capacity in Haiti, while seeking partners to share facilities and costs.

⁷⁴ Bring in additional support as needed to ensure an adequate analysis of a Theory of Change.

⁷⁵ LWF staff suggested there could be flyers in Creole and French (in addition to Annual Reports) and notice boards with relevant project information in intervention areas.

⁷⁶ As an example, Norway is a donor that has been actively supporting environmental activities over the past few years in Haiti. See <http://www.norad.no/en/tools-and-publications/publications/norad-reports/publication?key=406210>

⁷⁷ This is often done together with a consortium of agencies to share costs and facilitate comparisons.

Recommendations for the medium to long term (next strategy)

1. Keep the Theory of Change at the center of the planning process and engage key partners, community representatives and other key stakeholders during the process to ensure that the strategic vision and what “success” looks like (i.e. objectives and indicators) are known and shared by key stakeholders. Examples of innovations could help support this are a GIS-based database system to support information management and additional technical support for chosen specialist areas (e.g. environment, microcredit, cash transfer systems, etc.).
2. While building on the core strengths of LWF Haiti and their partners, assess and the pros and cons of different funding streams to understand which are best suited to the Theory of Change. Note that “core strengths” may require focusing on a smaller number of sectors and becoming known for this work and adjusting LWF’s capacity and/or partnership model to be able to deliver the required level of technical and programmatic support.⁷⁸
3. Support development and dissemination of LWF Haiti’s strategy with a robust communication strategy. This includes a 1-2 page version of the strategy that can be used as a communication tool for LWF staff, partners, communities and other stakeholders.
4. LWF Haiti’s new strategy should include:
 - a. A clear articulation of the Theory of Change that can be adapted to major disasters or other scenarios that cause a dramatic change in the operating context and makes it easy to demonstrate LWF Haiti’s value added to external stakeholders at higher levels (regional, national and global).
 - b. A specific section in the strategy on partnership that clearly defines capacity building objectives, ways of working and how progress will be measured.
 - c. A specific emphasis on resilience⁷⁹ as a constructive building block to achieve climate change justice. Such an approach is likely be more attractive to potential donors, especially since resilience is at the heart of LWF’s current approaches to DRR and development in the Haiti context.
 - d. Value-added of LWF as an international NGO working in Haiti, including a description of its role in building national capacities, promoting innovation, improved outcome measurement and quality assurance.

⁷⁸ The assumption behind this recommendation is that, if LWF focuses on a reduced number of sectors and becomes known and sought after as a specialist agency in a particular area, they will likely have more impact. Should LWF Haiti decides to maintain a focus on environmental protection, they would use this as a platform to engage in other sectors according to their Theory of Change. For example, if youth are identified as a key target group, LWF Haiti could promote environmental awareness in schools using tools such as the curriculum developed by UMCOR.

⁷⁹ http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Think%20Pieces/3_disaster_risk_resilience.pdf

- e. Clarity about how LWF's support will affect lives of the poorest segments of the community.
 - f. A shared commitment with other ACT Alliance members to define common objectives, ways of working and LWF's primary role(s).
 - g. A risk assessment and risk management framework.
5. Agree on benchmarks to track progress of partners in terms of capacity development and sustainability.
 6. Similar benchmarks should be developed in consultation with CBOs based on their respective community development plans.⁸⁰

Recommendations for LWF-DWS

7. LWF-DWS should identify their role as part of LWF Haiti's Theory of Change, notably in terms of technical support and their potential global advocacy role.
8. While Climate Change Justice and Environment Protection are an important component of the global strategy, experience from Haiti suggests that LWF-DWS need to enhance their ability to provide technical support and guidance at a global level for priority themes in their strategy.
9. Support Country Programs to review and revise their strategies following a major change in the operating environment (such as the 2010 Earthquake) using a scenario-based approach.
10. Unless justified by the Theory of Change for the next strategy (or other compelling reasons) LWF in Haiti should transition from being "LWF Haiti-Caribbean" to "LWF Haiti" with responsibility for DRR for the Dominican Republic being transferred to the Regional Hub in El Salvador.
11. Maintain an emergency response capacity and infrastructure for LWF-DWS as part of their added-value in Haiti. This should be done in close collaboration with other ACT Alliance partners (and other key partners) as support to their own preparedness – preferably in cost sharing arrangements to not only reduce costs to LWF, but also encourage joint ownership of infrastructure and standby capacities.
12. While revising the PMER system, LWF-DWS should include guidance on evaluability assessments⁸¹ to estimate time and resources required for a useful

⁸⁰ The Associate Program in Cambodia uses a three-tier benchmark system for determining their approach and exit strategies for CBOs.

⁸¹ The term "evaluability assessment" is used here as a way of assessing the extent to which the Theory of Change is clear and what relevant data is available to decide firstly, whether a project or program can be realistically evaluated and, secondly, if it can then what sort of time and human resources are needed. In the case of the LWF Haiti, the strategy could be evaluated, but the difficulties in accessing relevant data in such a limited timeframe limited the scope.

product and ensure that expectations are clear. Practical guidance to help Country Programs prepare for evaluations would also be useful.

13. Support LWF Haiti (and other Country Programs) by supporting improvements in planning, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (PMER) systems, notably in terms of outcome measurement, synthesized reporting systems and information management systems.
14. Support LWF Haiti as needed with a review of their human resource capacity and assessment of capacity building needs.

Recommendations for LWF Partners


15. Improve mutual understanding regarding LWF Haiti's strategy, vision, mission and institutional commitments⁸² to clarify expectations, preferred ways of working and mutual accountability during collaborative processes.
16. Actively participate in LWF Haiti's planning process for their next strategy and come prepared to clearly communicate the partner's own strategic objectives and commitments to which they wish to be accountable for.

Recommendations for Related Agencies


17. Clarify and seek consensus with LWF-DWS Haiti on the respective strengths, roles and value-added, to identify options for 'win-win' collaboration.
18. As part of the strategic planning process, reach a consensus with LWF Haiti regarding expectations on the formats and timing of reporting with the aim of improving efficiency and quality.
19. Clarify respective agency positions should LWF Haiti and their partners decide to adopt an approach that focuses on resilience.
20. Update joint contingency planning for disasters, including a continuing to follow up on recommendations from the 2011 evaluation of the ACT Alliance response to the earthquake. Consider cost-sharing arrangements for LWF Haiti's standby capacity in Leogane.

⁸² Including LWF's commitments as a HAP certified member.

Annex 1: LWF Haiti Staffing Structure (as of January 2014)



Annex 2: LWF Haiti Projects 2009-2014



Project Name	Timeframe	Budget (Euros)	Implementing Agency
18-4212, Institutional Development 79 (25 Females)	1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011	135,542	LWF, RNDDH
18-4213, Sustainable Livelihoods In Environmentally Critical Areas	1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011	903,614	LWF
18-4214, Sustainable Transition Of Previous Interventions	1 January 2009 to 31 December 2011	188,253	CBO, local authorities, CODAB, CHAAB, MOSCTHA, FNGA
18-4414, Act Appeal HTI101, Haiti Earthquake Emergency	1 February 2010 to 31 December 2011	13,709,948	CBO, locales authorities, ITECA Episcopal Church in Haiti, CODEP, CODAB
18-4635, Haiti Earthquake Danida II, Livelihoods	1 April 2010 to 30 December 2011	968,515	CBO, Local authorities
18-4640, Model Resettlement Village for Earthquake Affected Families o Gressier	1 January 2012 to 31 March 2013	3,825,579	LWF
18-4635, Haiti Earthquake Danida II, Livelihoods	1 April 2010 to 30 December 2011	968,515	CBOs, local authorities
18-4642, Women's Bank Project	1 September 2012 to 31 December 2014	279,000	FNGA
18-4643, Model Resettlement Village For Earthquake Affected Families Of Gressier - Phase 2	01 April 2013 to 31 December 2014	909,545	LWF
18-4644, Access To Potable Water in Grand Anse Area Of Haiti	1 March 2013 to 31 December 2013	144,843	FNGA
18-4645, Sustainable Livelihoods In Bois Bocot Model Village, Gressier	1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013	89,639	LWF
18-4646, Organizational Capacity and Mechanisms Generating Revenue of Rural Communities and Vulnerable In the Palmes Region	1 June 2013 to 30 November 2013	86,367	RODEP
18-4415, HTI121 Assistance to Affected Population By Tropical Storm Isaac and Hurricane Sandy	1 September 2012 to 31 August 2013	729,040	RSFP, FNGA, RODEP
18-4416, Emergency Sub Hub in Haiti	1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013	61,652	LWF
18-4215, Integrated Development and Sustainable Livelihoods in rural Communities of West and Grand'Anse	1 January 2012 to 31 December 2014	1,741,192	RSFP, FNGA, RODEP
Total		23,136,957	

Annex 3: Field Visit Itinerary

Date	Activity	Location
12 Jan	Arrival of Team Leader	Port au Prince
13 Jan	Preparation for the field trips. Interviews at LWF Haiti Office	Port au Prince
14 Jan	Travel to Model Village. Interviews. Focus group discussions	Gressier
15 Jan	Fly to Jeremie. Interviews with FNGA (local partner). Travel by car to Macaya.	Overnight in FNGA guesthouse, Despagne.
16 Jan	Interviews with beneficiary communities, focus groups, observations. Back to Jeremie in the afternoon	Overnight in Jeremie
17 Jan	Fly back to PAP in the morning and to Thiotte by car from airport. Interview CODAB (former local partner)	Overnight in Thiotte
18 Jan	Travel by car from Thiotte to Foret des Pins- Interviews with local communities at Foret des Pins. Travel by car from – Foret des Pins to Port au Prince in the afternoon	Port au Prince
19 Jan	Interviews and Team Meeting	Port au Prince
20 Jan	Interviews	Port au Prince
21 Jan	Interviews	Port au Prince
22 Jan	Interviews	Port au Prince
23 Jan	Team Meeting and Workshop Prep	Port au Prince
24 Jan	Validation Workshop	Port au Prince
25 Jan	Interviews with Local Partners	Port au Prince
26 Jan	Departure of Team Leader	
29 Jan	Interviews by national consultant	Port au Prince
30 Jan	Interviews by national consultant	Port au Prince

Annex 4: Interview Guides

A set of questions and sub-questions were developed based on the TOR for the evaluation that were used to organize results from interviews, focus group discussions and document research. The questions in the table below provided the framework for the evidence matrix the team used to collate and analyze data. There is also an interview guide that was used to guide community-level consultations.

Questions	Sub-Questions
What perspective does this key informant have on LWF Haiti's strategy and program?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How long have you been involved with LWF Haiti and in what capacity? What is your professional background and your particular area of expertise?
What is the operating environment for agencies such as LWF in Haiti?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> How has this evolved since the beginning of the current strategy? Has the evolution influenced men and women differently? How? How is this likely to change over the next 3-6 years? Some specific focus/themes will be useful, for example: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aid flow; Government's attitude towards aid agencies and NGOs; social welfare programs/anti-poverty policies and programs; World Bank funding; UN role/MINUSTAH mandate; civil society trends
What is the <u>relevance</u> of the strategy to the country program as a whole and the different projects? How should LWF Haiti's experiences inform the next strategy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Context:</i> Do the strategic goals, objectives and plans remain relevant and appropriate in the current and emerging context (i.e. political, economic, social, cultural, environmental context, disaster risks, funding situation)? <i>Prioritization:</i> Has the selection of geographic working areas, thematic issues and focus groups been appropriate? Are the geographical areas still appropriate? How have these been coordinated with other actors? <i>Changes in objectives/indicators:</i> have the objectives and/or indicators in the strategy changed over time and, if so, how and why? <i>Progress:</i> What is the overall progress against the objectives of LWF Haiti's strategy? What about the component projects? Are there specific achievements related to girls and women? <i>Gaps:</i> What are the major gaps/areas for improvement and how have these been addressed? Is there anything that should have been done differently? Have women and girls benefitted from the project as much as men and boys? <i>Structure:</i> Is the overall structure appropriate to the program and its constituent projects and supporting activities? <i>Perception by stakeholders:</i> How do you think various groups (women, men, boys, girls and minority groups) perceive the value of the project? <i>Strategic links:</i> How does LWF Haiti link bilateral projects and Statement of Needs (SoN) with the country strategy?⁸³ <i>What are the links with LWF-DWS' global strategy?</i> <i>Lessons learned:</i> what should be kept from the current strategy? What could change in the next strategy? Could new approaches and

⁸³ The existing CS is a product of various pre CS processes including community consultations, stakeholder analyses, baseline surveys, impact assessments and programme evaluations carried out over a period of time prior to the finalization of the CS. The Model Village Project in Gressier and the Solvatten Project in Grand'Anse are projects that have been added after the formulation of the CS.

Questions	Sub-Questions
	<p>innovations address gaps?</p>
<p>How <u>effective</u> has the LWF program been during this current strategy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Project Implementation</i>: How were projects objectives identified and indicators formulated? How effectively have projects achieved their objectives, or based on evidence so far, how likely are the objectives to be achieved? • <i>Accountability to stakeholders</i>: How has accountability to the focus groups/communities been addressed? • <i>Perception of LWF</i>: How do local actors and other stakeholders perceive the work of LWF and its added value? • <i>Coordination</i>: How does LWF co-ordinate its work both internally and with others? • <i>Cross-cutting Issues</i>: To what extent mainstreaming issues such as Gender, Environmental, Psychosocial and Human Rights aspects have been taken into account in the programme? • <i>Rights-based approach</i>: How has LWF Haiti addressed RBA and advocacy, including links between grassroots issues and high level advocacy policy at a national or global level? • <i>Partnership</i>: How effective have partnership approaches been and how these might be strengthened? • <i>Selection of partners</i>: were the partner selection criteria appropriate? • <i>Consistency of partner approaches with LWF's accountability framework</i>: how well-aligned are partners with LWF in terms of communication, participation, complaints systems, etc.?
<p>How <u>efficient</u> has the LWF program been during this current strategy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Measurement</i>: How does LWF Haiti measure efficiency? What M & E system exists and what type of data are gathered and monitored by LWF to track progress? • Have resources for sectoral interventions been efficiently used to achieve relevant outputs? Have the interventions been implemented within intended deadlines and cost estimates? • Were implementation capacities of partners adequate to deliver activities in a timely and efficient manner? What measures were taken to assure the quality of results and management practices, both in relation to process and products? • <i>Strengths & gaps</i>: Has LWF Haiti been run in an efficient manner? What were the strengths, gaps or constraints? • <i>Cost drivers</i>: Which of LWF Haiti's activities are the biggest cost drivers⁸⁴? What are the reasons for this? Are the key activities being implemented in a cost-effective manner? • <i>Risk Management</i>: How effectively has the LWF-Haiti program managed risk? • <i>Lessons learned</i>: What lessons have been learned and how were the lessons learned applied to increase efficiency?
<p>What have been the <u>Outcomes and Impacts</u> of the Country Strategy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Measurement</i>: How does LWF Haiti and their partners measure outcomes and impacts? Which of the outcomes in the original logframe and project design are being achieved, or likely to be achieved? • <i>Results</i>: Has LWF Haiti made a difference? If yes, how has it made a

⁸⁴ A “cost driver” is term is used in activity-based costing analysis that refers to a factor that directly causes a change in the cost of an activity and typically changes as levels of an activity vary.

Questions	Sub-Questions
	difference, and for whom? In what ways have vulnerable groups, poor, women and men, girls and boys enhanced their capacities (been empowered) to address their situation?
What is the sustainability of LWF's activities?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Community ownership</i>: are the local organizational structures involved in the decision making process? How are communities developing their capacities? • <i>Exit strategies</i>: Have exit strategies been developed at the outset? • <i>Capacity of partners</i>: what is LWF Haiti's capacity development strategy for local partners and what is its status? • <i>Fundraising</i>: what other sources of funds might be available to support LWF Haiti activities?
What has been the evolution of the LWF Haiti's organizational development and management during the current strategy?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Targets met</i>: what were LWF Haiti's organisational targets and to what extent have these been met? • <i>Adaptation to changes</i>: How has LWF Haiti adapted to a changing donor environment? • <i>Learning</i>: to what extent is LWF Haiti a learning organisation? What mechanisms are in place and how are these functioning? How does the current PME system supports learning and management processes?
What is the assessment of the current preparedness and response of the country program (LWF Haiti and partners)?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Preparedness</i>: What is the capacity (current and planned) to respond to recurrent and or rapid on set emergencies? • <i>Lessons-learned</i>: what were the major lessons learned from the 2010 earthquake and how have these been incorporated into DRR and preparedness?
Status of LWF partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Trends</i>: What are likely trends during the next strategic period? • <i>What is the theory of change</i> while working through partners; are there sectors/themes that should be directly implemented by LWF Haiti? • <i>What criteria</i> have been used to choose the partners? Are these criteria still valid? • <i>Are there potential new partners?</i> • <i>What is the division of roles and responsibilities</i> between LWF and partners? • <i>What have been difficulties in the past co-operation?</i> • <i>What is LWF Haiti's capacity building strategy</i> for partners (for example handing over a sector/region in the mid-term; etc.)
Are there any relevant documents that we should review?	
Is there anyone else that you think we should try and speak to?	
Any other comments?	

1.1. Interview Guide (community-level focus group discussions)

1. In what way have you participated in/come in contact with the LWF Haiti and/or their partners? Who else in your community was involved? How were they involved?
2. What do you know about their activities? How did you get information?
3. What have been the most significant moments and changes (security, livelihoods or other factors) in recent years affecting you and your family? How have these changes affected different members of your family?
4. What assistance or other support have you received from LWF Haiti and/or their partners? From other agencies?
5. Has the project made a difference? If yes, for whom in particular? What has changed for the targeted women and men, girls and boys? What has changed in authorities?
6. What is the most important change brought about by the project?
7. How would you describe the assistance? (Crucial? Useful? Did not make much change?) were there gaps in the assistance provided? Which are these? (...give details).
8. Who had the opportunity to influence the project (i.e. women, men, girls, boys, marginalized groups)?
9. Has the project been relevant to your needs? Whose needs has the project been most relevant for? (men, women, boys, girls). Were there any interventions by LWF or their partners which were not necessarily according to you needs?
10. What was the biggest success of LWF Haiti and/or their partners? Why? How does LWF Haiti and/or their partners compare with other agencies working here?
11. Were there any problems? Why? How have the activities affected men? Women? Boys and girls? The elderly or other vulnerable groups?
12. How does LWF Haiti communicate with you and you with them?
13. Do you have any suggestions for improvement for LWF Haiti and/or their partners? Please give examples.

Annex 5: List of Persons Interviewed

LWF Haiti

<i>Name</i>	<i>Function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Perolof Lundkvist	Country Representative	1		Dec 16	Skype	JB
Maxi Robens	Program Coordinator	1		Jan 13	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Amenold Pierre	Program Coordinator-Grand'Anse	1		Jan 16	Jeremie	JB & AA
RRD & Psychosocial staff members	RRD Officer, RRD Officer Assistant, Psychosocial Officer	2	1	Jan 20	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Program's staff	Program Coordinator, Community Mobilizer Coordinator, Palms Coordinator, Program support & QA Officer, Program Assistant & Admin Officer, Community Mobilizer	2	4	Jan 20	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Finance staff	Finance Manager, Senior Accountant, Accountant, Cashier	2	2	Jan 20	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Senior Management TEam	Country representative, HR & Adm Officer, Program Coord., Finance Manager	1	3	Jan 20	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Administration Human Ressources staff	Procurement Officer, Admin and HR Manager, Program Support, Logistics Officer d'approvisionnement, Driver, Gardian	3	1	Jan 21	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Livelihood's staff	Agricultural Technician & MUSO Specialist Palms Coordinator	4		Jan 22	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Louis Dorvilier	LWF Former Country Representative	1		Jan 23	Port au Prince	JB & AA

Haiti (Partners)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
4 staff members	Syndic Village Modèle/ General Coordinator, Public Relations, Advisors	3	1	Jan 14	Gressier	JB & AA
Jude St Gilles	Technical Coordinator FNGA		1	Jan 15	Jeremie	JB & AA
Illia Henry	Muso Coordinator, FNGA		1	Jan 15, 16	Macaya/Despargnes	JB & AA
Louis Blanchard	Environmental Coordinator, FNGA	1		Jan 15	Macaya/Despargnes	JB & AA
Berthony Chery	Resp. Suivi et accompagnateur des agriculteurs FNGA	1		Jan 16	Macaya/Despargnes	JB & AA
Petuel Azor	Head of Administration staff of COOPCAB	1		Jan 17	Thiotte	JB & AA
Wilcinot Levoy	CODAP's Coordinator	1		Jan 17	Thiotte	JB & AA
6 Member's	Réseau des Planteurs pour la Protection de la Foret des Pins (Coordinator, members of RRD Brigad, Members of MUSO, Members of Planters Association)	6		Jan 18	Foret des Pins	JB & AA
Partners	Logistic Coordinator Manager of RODEP Technical Coordinator and General Coordinator of FNGA Coordinator and Secretary of RSFP	6		Janv 25	LWF Haiti	JB & AA
Vilès Avilar	Head of Program, RNDDH	1		Jan 29	RNDDH Office, PAP- Haiti	AA

Haiti (Community Members/Beneficiaries)

<i>Community members</i>	<i>Profile</i>	<i>Implementing partners/Project</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Beneficiaries	Female residents – all have children.	Model village		8	Jan 14	Model Village, Gressier	JB & AA

<i>Community members</i>	<i>Profile</i>	<i>Implementing partners/Project</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
	Two are members of WASH Committee						
Beneficiaries	8 female residents of which 3 are single HoH	Model village		8		Model Village, Gressier	MF & MC
Beneficiaries	Members of MUSO group all have children	Direct intervention by LWF in adjacent community to model village assisted by another NGO (Mercy)	3	6	Jan 14	Gressier-Village Mercy	MF & MC
Beneficiaries	Members of MUSO group all have children. President and Treasurer in group	See above	6	5	Jan 14	Gressier-Village Mercy	JB & AA
MUSO, CBO, women's organization, Brigade committee, WASH committee, community leader, planters organization	Bene-ficiaries	FNGA	8	11	Jan 16	Despaigne/Macaya	JB & AA
Merchants	Non beneficiaries	FNGA		6	Jan 16	Despaigne/Macaya	JB & AA
Planters	Non beneficiaries	FNGA	4		Jan 16	Despaigne/Macaya	JB & AA
Planters/Breeders	Bene-ficiaries	RPSFP	1	1	Jan 18	Lespes	JB & AA
Merchants	Non Beneficiaries	RPSFP		2	Jan 18	Foret des Pins	JB & AA
Breeder	Bene-ficiary	RPSFP	1		Jan 18	Forets des Pins	JB & AA

Haiti (External)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Sylvera Guillaume	Technical Coordinator of Civil Protection Office (Bureau de Protection civile)	1		Jan 14	Protection civile Office, Gressier	JB & AA
Wilson Jean	Administrator, Marie de Gressier		1	Jan 14	Mairie Gressier	JB & AA
Jean-Michel Vigreux	CARE Haiti Country Director	1		Jan 19	Port au Prince	JB
Martine Bernier	Former CLIO Coordinator		1	Jan 21	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Robert Labrousse	MPCE Secretary of State	1		Jan 21	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Joel Boutroue	Special Advisor on Haiti, Govt. of Norway	1		Jan 22	Port au Prince	JB
Junior Armel Belizaire	Chief of M&E Services, UCAONG	1		Jan 30	UCAONG Office, Port au Prince Haiti	AA
Bernice Clavanac Clement	UCAONG Director		1	Jan 30	UCAONG Office, Port au Prince Haiti	AA
Paul Judex Edouarzin	Consultant en Environnement, UNDP		1	Jan 29	Port au Prince, Haiti (skype)	AA

LWF-DWS HQ

<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Michael French	Program Officer	1		Jan 29	Geneva	JB
Sophie Gebreyes	Former Program Officer for LWF Haiti/Caribbean and acting Country Director for Haiti		1	Feb 7	Addis Ababa	JB (written responses)

Related Agencies

<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
Katarina Inkinen,	Program Officer, Church of Sweden		1	Dec 18	Uppsala (Skype)	JB
Prosperity Raymond	Christian Aid Haiti Country Director & CLIO	1		Jan 19	Ouagadougou (Skype)	JB

<i>Name</i>	<i>Org. and function</i>	M	F	<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Interviewer</i>
	Coordinator					
Susan Watkins	Head of Mission		1	Jan 22	Port au Prince	JB & AA
Maija-Liisa Fors	Regional Representative for Latin America and Caribbean, Finn		1	Jan 22	Port au Prince (Skype)	JB
Mary Marete	Program Director for Sustainable Development, ELCA		1	Jan 22	Chicago, USA (Skype)	JB

Annex 6: List of Key Reference Documents

- Crenn, B. et al. (2011) Mid-term evaluation of the LWF/DWS Haiti Country Strategy 2009-2014.
- FNGA (2011) Evaluation de l'élevage Porcin au niveau de la vallée de la Grand'Anse
- GERMAX (2013) Evaluation of the potential effectiveness and efficiency gains of working directly with local NGOs in the humanitarian interventions of the Commission.
http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/2013/LNGO_Evaluation.pdf
- Hector, J.B. (2013) Rapport d'évaluation du village modèle de Gressier
- International Monetary Fund (2008) Haiti Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper / Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08115.pdf>
- LWF-DWS Accountability Framework ⁸⁵
- LWF-DWS Global Strategy 2012 – 2017
http://www.lutheranworld.org/sites/default/files/LWF-Strategy-2012_2017-EN-low.pdf
- LWF-HAITI (2011) Appendix 9 - Management Work on Recommendations from Mid-Term Evaluation
- LWF-Haiti Project Document 2012-2014 (still draft?)
- LWF Haiti Country Strategy 2009 – 2014
- McGearty, S. et al. (2012) An Independent Final Evaluation of the Action of Churches Together Alliance Haiti Appeal HTI-101 (Jan 2010 - Dec 2011)
<http://www.alnap.org/resource/6339>
- Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe - UNAONG (2013) Projet de Loi – Cadre Fixant le Statut General des Associations en Haïti
- Pierre, A. et al. (2012) Evaluation Institutionnelle de la Fondation Nouvelle Grand 'anse (FNGA)
- Root Capital (2013) COOP CAP Rapid Impact Evaluation
http://www.rootcapital.org/sites/default/files/downloads/root_capital_coopcab.pdf
- Tulane University & l'Université de l'Etat d'Haïti (2012) Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Evaluation from a Resilience Perspective
- Turnbull, M., Sterrett, C. L. & Hilleboe, A. (2013) Toward Resilience: A Guide to Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation. ECB Project.
<http://www.alnap.org/resource/9251>
- The evaluation team also reviewed a selection of LWF Haiti & Caribbean project reports, agreements, baseline studies, work plans from the strategy period.

⁸⁵ <http://www.lutheranworld.org/content/lwfdws-accountability-framework>

Annex 7: Validation Workshop – Agenda & Participation Evaluations

Atelier FLM Evaluation: FLM Haïti & Partenaires Agenda & Orientation pour les groupes Port au Prince, le 22 janvier 2014 (ver. 140122)

Objectifs :

A la fin de l'atelier, les participants :

- Seront informés des conclusions et recommandations préliminaires de l'équipe d'évaluation et l'occasion leur aura été donnée de les valider et de les compléter;
- Auront une compréhension commune des attentes au niveau des bailleurs et du siège de la FLM par rapport au système de planification, de suivi et d'évaluation de la FLM en Haïti / caraïbes et dans le monde ;
- Auront un consensus préliminaire sur les leçons apprises et les recommandations prioritaires de la stratégie actuelle. Eléments qu'ils devront prendre en compte lors de l'élaboration de la prochaine stratégie.

Agenda

Heure	Action	Facilitateur	Format
09:00-09:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accueil • Introduction et clarifier les objectifs de l'atelier • Règles de base et de logistique 	Représentant Jock	Plénière
09:30-10:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Présentation des conclusions et des recommandations provisoires de l'évaluation de la stratégie de la FLM Haïti / Caraïbes • Questions & Réponses 	Ammcise	Plénière et « <i>buzz groups</i> »
10:15 - 10:45	Pause café		
10:45 – 11:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Principes de la Gestion Axée sur les Résultats • Questions & Réponses 	Jock	Plénière
11:15- 12:15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Session de travail de groupe : rôles et responsabilités de la FLM, des partenaires et des autres parties prenantes 		Groupes de travail
12:15 – 12:45	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Présentation plénière des groupes de travail 	Ammcise	
12 :45 – 13 :45	Pause déjeuner		
13 :45 – 14:45	Session de travail de groupe : recommandations		Groupes de travail
14:45 – 15 :30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion sur les recommandations • Clôture et Évaluation de l'atelier 	Jock	Plénière
Pause café et départ			

Conseils pour les sessions en Groupes de travail

Instructions pour les groupes de travail :

- Répartir les rôles d'animateur, de rapporteur et de chronométreur parmi les membres du groupe.
- Le temps imparti est limité, les animateurs (et chronométreurs) doivent alors s'assurer que les participants ont suffisamment développé les points clés à présenter en session plénière.

Groupe de travail 1 - Rôles et responsabilités de la FLM, de ses partenaires ainsi que l'influence des autres parties prenantes

Objectifs - Les principaux objectifs de cette session de travail sont d'identifier la répartition des rôles et des responsabilités entre la FLM et ses partenaires et de définir comment les différentes parties prenantes (y compris la communauté) peuvent influencer les résultats des projets de la FLM et ses partenaires.

Questions pour Discussion :

- En dehors de la FLM et de ses partenaires opérationnels, quelles sont les parties prenantes clés ? Peuvent-ils avoir une influence (positive ou négative) sur les résultats?

Partie Prenante	Influence Positive ?	Influence Négative?

Evaluation d'Atelier par les Participants

	Très Utile	Utile	Moyen	Pas de tout
Est ce que l'Atelier vous a été utile?	14	6	1	-
	Excellent	Bon	Moyen	Pas de tout
Dans quelle mesure l'atelier a-t-il atteint les objectifs fixés précédemment cités?	4	16	1	-
	Excellent	Bon	Passable	Pas satisfaisant
Comment évalueriez-vous l'animation de l'atelier?	7	12	2	-
	Excellent	Bon	Passable	Pas satisfaisant
Comment évalueriez-vous le lieu, etc. de cet atelier ?	9	10	2	-

Travaux de Groupe : Resultats

TRAVAUX DE GROUPE : EVALUATION DES RECOMMANDATIONS PROVISIORES						
<p>Questions pour Discussion :</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Validation : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Y a-t-il des recommandations manquantes ? Les recommandations sont-elles vraiment pertinentes ? Peuvent-elles réellement être mises en pratique ? Comment la formulation des recommandations pourrait être améliorée ? Quelle est l'urgence intrinsèque à la mise en pratique de chacune de ces recommandations ? Autres commentaires pertinents pour la présentation en plénière ? 						
	Recommandations Proposées	Pertinence	Pratique	Reformulation	Urgence intrinsèque	Recommandations manquantes
Groupe 1	Elaborer une stratégie de sortie et transition (d'ici au 31 décembre 2014)	OUI			NON	
	Mettre en place un plan d'accompagnement en vue du renforcement des capacités des partenaires en fonction des besoins préalablement des partenaires en matière de renforcement des capacités.	OUI		Mettre en place un plan d'accompagnement en vue du renforcement des capacités des partenaires en fonctions des besoins identifiés.	OUI	(motivation
Groupe 2	Impliquer davantage les communautés dans la planification et suivi des activités, y compris de transformer le système de plaintes en "plaintes <u>ET</u> feedback"	OUI			OUI	Renforcement des capacités du personnel en terme de formation et de mesure d'incitation (court terme).

TRAVAUX DE GROUPE : EVALUATION DES RECOMMANDATIONS PROVISOIRES						
	Réaliser des enquêtes post interventions pour évaluer l'impact					Mise en place d'un système de suivi et d'évaluation./Définir les principes de la "Theory of Change' au niveau de la FLM
Groupe 3	Impliquer davantage les communautés dans la planification et suivi des activités, y compris de transformer le système de plaintes en "plaintes <u>ET</u> feedback"	OUI	OUI	Mettre en place un processus de planification et de mise en oeuvre participative des activités		Diviser la recommandation initiale en 2 (tel que formule)
	Focaliser les actions dans des secteurs et zones prioritaires selon les principes de la "Theory of Change"	OUI	OUI	Mettre en oeuvre les activités de la FLM dans les secteurs et zones prioritaires en appliquant les principes de la "Theory of change".	OUI	
Groupe 4	Intégrer dans la stratégie 2015-20 une stratégie d'engagement avec les parties prenantes ainsi qu'une stratégie de communication externe.	OUI			OUI	Pourquoi strategie de communication externe? De préférence une strategie de communication qui tiendra compte de l'interne et de l'externe
	Améliorer le système de suivi et évaluation pour mieux démontrer les résultats et l'impact des réalisations	OUI			OUI	

TRAVAIL DE GROUPE - rôles et responsabilités de la FLM, des partenaires et des autres parties prenantes

Questions pour discussion :

1. En dehors de la FLM et de ses partenaires opérationnels, quelles sont les parties prenantes clés ?
2. Peuvent-ils avoir une influence (positive ou négative) sur les résultats ?

	Domaine retenu	Partie Prenante	Influence Positive ?	Influence Négative?
Groupe 4	MUSO	Bénéficiaires	Valorisation et durabilité/Amélioration du niveau de vie des membres de la communauté. Renforcement de l'esprit de solidarité	Mauvais usage des fonds
		L'Etat	Définition d'un cadre légal pour l'implémentation. Etablissement d'un climat de sécurité	Non participation : désinformation sur les activités, méfiance des bailleurs
		Les consultants	Renforcement des capacités des Mutuelles via formations et évaluations	Mauvaise consultation: Gaspillage de fonds, retard dans les résultats.
		Institutions financières	Développement ou création de coopérative, de banques et de caisses populaires.	Taux d'intérêt exorbitants sur les crédits peut paralyser le mouvement des investisseurs.
		Les ONG nationales et/ou internationales	Support financier(transfert de fonds). Renforcement des capacités intellectuelles (formation).	Duplication des activités. Problèmes de réseautage
		Les Maisons de transfert	Faciliter les transferts de fonds	
Groupe 3	Mutuelle de Solidarité: Appui Technique et Financier / Renforcement des capacités: Formations, visites d'échange,	Membres de la communautés	Appréciation du projet par la communauté	Rejet du projet
		OCB	Forte Participation dans l'exécution du projet	
		Elus locaux	Accompagnement	

	Domaine retenu	Partie Prenante	Influence Positive ?	Influence Négative?
	Matériels, Infrastructures, rencontres communautaires)	Notables	des cartes	
		Bailleurs	Valider et Transférer les fonds a temps	
Groupe 2	Droits Humains	ONI	Faciliter l'identification des gens de la communauté	Livraison tardive des cartes
		Communauté	Bonne collaboration et participation	Imprévisible/Instable/Idées préconçues
		MAST	Bonne collaboration au niveau Communautaire	Retard au niveau dans la livraison au niveau national et périodique
		Office de l'Etat Civil	Permettre aux gens de la communauté d'avoir des actes de naissance	Absent dans les sections communales/Avoir un système très démodé
		RNDDH		Plan de formation n'est pasadapte aux resultats escomptes
		Leaders Communautaires	Faciliter la mobilisation et Motivation de la communaute	Instabilite du leader
Groupe 1		FLM	Oui	
		Partenaires	Oui	
		Communaute	Oui	
		Autorites(Mairie,ASEC, CASEC)	Oui	Oui
		Police	Oui	Oui
		Parlementaires	Oui	Oui
		Ministeres	Oui	Oui
		Ass. Juridique	Oui	Oui
		Bailleurs	Oui	
		Organisations Financieres	Oui	

Annex 8: Terms of Reference

LWF HAITI/CARRIBEAN COUNTRY PROGRAMME

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Programme Title: LWF/DWS Haiti/ Caribbean Mid-Term Program
Evaluation

Period of Evaluation: January 2009 to December 2013

Date of Evaluation: Arrival in Haiti on 11.1.2014

Departure on 26.1.2014

From 14 January 2014 to 26 January 2014. Debriefing
scheduled for January, 25 (morning).

Geographical/Project Coverage: see Annex 1

Project Areas: - Long term development Project areas

Macaya in the Department of Grand'Anse,

Commune of Thiotte in the Arrondissement de Bel
Anse,

Department of the South-East

Foret des Pins, Department of the West

Vaudreuil, Commune of Cité Soleil, Department of the
West

- Emergency Response areas

Pétion Ville, (Nerette et St. Therese camps)

Gressier

Leogane

Petit Goâve

Grand Goâve

Funding Partners: Church of Sweden (COS)

Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA)

Finn Church Aid (FCA)

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)
International Orthodox Church Charities (IOCC)
Dan Church Aid (DCA)
Lutheran World Relief (LWR)
Canadian Lutheran World Relief (CLWR)
Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO)
Primate's World Development and Relief Fund (PWDRF)

PROGRAMME BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

In 2008, LWF Haiti/Caribbean designed a new country strategy for six years (2009 – 2014) aiming to challenge and respond to the causes and consequences of human sufferings and poverty through empowering and promoting the human rights of the marginalized and vulnerable within Haitian society to claim and enjoy their rights.

The strategy defines five objectives as focus for the period of 2009-2014:

- 1. The impact of disasters in the communities is reduced*
- 2. Livelihoods and environment in areas of critical ecological impact are equally managed in a sustainable way*
- 3. People enjoy fully their rights as citizens of a State guaranteeing a rule of Law*
- 4. Women and men enjoy equal rights and opportunities in the communities where the programme is working*
- 5. LWF Haiti and its partners carry out high quality work in an accountable, transparent and coherent manner in order to contribute to high impact in communities.*

Based on that country strategy, three projects were designed providing the focus and activities for 3 years, 2009-2011 (Institutional Development / Capacity Building, Sustainable livelihood in environmentally critical areas, and the Sustainable Transition of previous intervention projects).

On January 12, 2010 a magnitude 7.3 earthquake struck Haiti to the west of the capital of Port-au-Prince near the town of Léogâne. It's estimated that over 200,000 people died and another 196,501 people were injured by the earthquake⁸⁶, an

⁸⁶ OCHA, Situation Report April, Haiti Earthquake

estimated 313,000 homes were damaged or destroyed, as well as countless commercial and public buildings. The needs remain enormous, and it will take years for Haiti to recover, considering the cyclic natural disaster risks due to climate change effects.

Since January 12, the country has continued to face other challenging events, more particularly the Hurricanes Thomas, Isaac and Sandy, draughts and floods, the cholera outbreak and the political instability that has persisted even following the presidential election that brought Mr. Joseph Michel Martelly to power. This pattern of chronic disaster is not expected to be attenuated without long term, integrated action to alter the root causes of failed development in Haiti.

In May 2011, LWF Haiti/Caribbean programme conducted a mid-term evaluation of the strategy and projects implemented with the aim of assessing the extent to which the strategy has been met, what progress has been achieved and what challenges are facing the programme. The evaluation report highlighted that the negative effects of 2010 had seriously delayed the implementation of the strategy and that LWF-Haiti/Caribbean should not change the 2009-2014 strategy. However, it needed to make essential changes in its implementation.

Taking evaluation recommendations into consideration, the new project document for 2012-2014 developed an integrated approach to implementing activities, not only in Macaya and Forêt des Pins where programme activities are on-going, but also in the Palmes Region where LWF Haiti/Caribbean has been successfully implementing a post-earthquake emergency/relief and early recovery project through ACT Appeal HTI101.

Although LWF/DWS Haiti country programme even in future will see as one of its primary tasks to respond quickly on emergencies, there is also a commitment to support long term development efforts of building sustainable livelihoods, protection of the environment, reduction of socio-economic and environmental vulnerabilities and strengthen the Haitian civil society through the building of strong community based organizations rooted in good governance and mutual accountability. We will look into possibilities to support the rehabilitation and recovery efforts in urban and rural areas where large numbers of homes, schools, drinking water installations were destroyed in the aftermath of January 12. Our programmes and activities are linking relief and rehabilitation efforts to development.

In 2014, the 6-year strategy stretching from 2008 to 2014 will end. 2014 will be a period of evaluation of the 6 years period and a preparation for the following strategy of 6 years. During this year of transition, much of the focus will be on analysis of the outcome of present programme activities but also of mapping needs for the shaping of a new strategy.

These Terms of Reference will provide a framework on the planned processes culminating in a final Country Strategy which will involve the participation of key stakeholders of the LWF/DWS Haiti programme.

The last evaluation of the current country strategy was conducted in 2011 and has provided direction how to improve the implementation of this country strategy.

1. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE Country Strategy Review (CSR)

The purpose of the CSR is both retrospective - looking backwards - as well as prospective - looking forwards. Its intention is firstly to take stock of the work of LWF and assess how the current LWF Country Strategy is being articulated and implemented in concept and practice and review progress achieved and constraints encountered during the current strategic planning phase to date. Based on this analysis, the CSR provides advice and practical recommendations for LWF Haiti/Caribbean to consider in developing the next phase of the strategic plan from 2015 onwards.

The specific objectives of the review are:

- To provide an informed and independent assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of the work of LWF-Haiti/Caribbean,
- To evaluate to what extent the programme reached the effectiveness, the efficiency and the sustainability required both within and outside the country,
- To provide a learning opportunity through a thorough in depth analyse of quality and outcome, the relevance of main activities, approaches and strategic directions of the country strategy regarding the changed context of Haiti,
- To give clear guidance to the strategy process 2015-2020, identifying major emphases to be included, based on consultation with key stakeholders'

2. Scope and specific questions of the Evaluation

To reach the objectives, the mission will include, but not be restricted to answering the following questions:

Relevance of the country programme as a whole and the different projects considering the context in Haiti

1. Was the overall strategy and its corresponding programme and projects relevant to the country and the focus groups/communities we serve?

Is there relevance and coherence in the overall structure of the programme and its constituent projects and supporting activities? How does LWF Haiti link bilateral projects

and SoN strategically with the country strategy? *(NB: The existing CS is a product of various pre CS processes including community consultations, stakeholder analyses, baseline surveys, impact assessments and programme evaluations carried out over a period of time prior to the finalization of the CS. The Model Village Project in Gressier and the Solvatten Project in Grand'Anse are projects that have been added after the formulation of the CS.*

2. Are the constituent projects and supporting activities implemented appropriate in its content and approach?
3. Do the strategic goals, objectives and plans remain relevant and appropriate in the current and emerging context (i.e. political, economic, social, cultural, environmental context, disaster risks, funding situation)?,
4. Would the approaches and methodologies used be still appropriate and sustainable? Are new one needed to better respond to the identified challenges?
5. What aspects of the programme would benefit from change, what aspects needs strengthening, etc.?

Effectiveness of the programme

1. Were the projects objectives properly identified?
2. How far have project objectives and plans been achieved? If not, specify reasons.
3. Are the strategies and approaches adopted well-designed and effective?
 - a) Is gender adequately recognised and addressed?
 - b) To what extent mainstreaming issues such as Gender, Environmental, Psychosocial and Human rights aspects have been taken into account in the programme?
 - c) How effective is the practice of rights-based approaches and advocacy by LWF Haiti and, in particular, the linkages made between grassroots issues and higher level advocacy policy?
4. Are the modalities of implementation through partners suitable and working? Is the partner selection criteria appropriate?
5. Are modes of operation adopted in carrying out programme and project actions, especially in the Development Projects effective?
6. Has the selection of geographic working areas, thematic issues and focus groups been appropriate? Are the geographical areas still appropriate?
7. How effectively the LWF-Haiti programme is addressing and coping with the risks created by on-going instability?
1. How has accountability to the focus groups/communities been addressed? Accountability **mechanisms** – how do focus groups participate and are informed of the projects? To what extent has the response been accountable

to the needs of the focus groups/programme participants/disaster-affected populations?

How do the complaints mechanisms in place work? How are possible complaints handled? Have there been cases reported? How have they influenced the management and conduct of the programme and/or approaches? How are they influencing the behaviour of the concerned? Do the beneficiaries feel they have been sufficiently informed and their feedback listened to?

8. How is the work of LWF regarded by local actors and other stakeholders? How does LWF co-ordinate its work both internally and with others?

Efficiency of the LWF Haiti

- a. Has LWF Haiti been run in an efficient manner? What were gaps or constraints? What are strong aspects?
- b. What lessons have been learned and how were the lessons learned applied in practice?

Outcomes and Impacts of the Country Strategy

- a. What have been the main outcomes and impact (positive and negative changes) of the programme as they affect the focus groups/communities and **the institutional environment**?
- b. Which ones are likely to be sustainable after eventual withdrawal?

Sustainability

- a. How effective are partnership approaches and how these might be strengthened? Are sustainability issues sufficiently taken into account? Are exit strategies anticipated from the onset of the partnership?
- b. Are the local organizational structures well involved in the decision making process? Are the communities developing their capacities to continue their own development?
- c. Institutional strengthening: - how solid are the accountability mechanisms of the partners and community based organizations?
- d. Are there possibilities/opportunities for alternative fundraising?
- e. Is the community participatory approach used at all the stages of the project?

Organizational Development and Management

- a. To what level LWF Haiti has achieved the organisational objectives of the country programme?

- b. What was the capacity and strategy to adapt to changing donor environment and fund raising possibilities (especially with regards to dwindling funding for Haiti)
- c. How far is LWF Haiti a learning organisation? Which mechanisms are put in place and are these operational? What have been major learnings within this Country Strategy? In how far does the current PME system supports learning and management processes?
- d. What are the challenges of the funding situation and how are they being addressed?

With the specific emergency situation in Haiti in 2010, a particular area for the evaluation is to look into **the emergency preparedness and response of the country programme**

- a. Assess the country programmes capacity to respond to recurrent and or rapid on set emergencies,
- b. Assess the response to the Earthquake emergency, its challenges and how they were addressed,
- c. What impacted those challenges and what kind of positive lessons can be learnt?

3. METHODOLOGY for the Country Strategy review

The Evaluation Team has the flexibility to choose different methods as necessary to fulfil the objectives. However it is vital that participatory approaches should be adopted especially for interactions with the field-based programme participants and local partner organisations. Given the constraints imposed by wide geographical coverage of the country programme and limited time of the Evaluation Team, it is understood that some rapid appraisal methods will need to be applied, and that only the key issues can receive due attention.

A Country Strategy workplan will be detailed by staff to map out the various activities and other details leading towards the final workshop.

The evaluation feeds into the country strategy building process of the LWF Country Team and should complement the efforts of the LWF. Thus, it is important in the inception phase to analyse what was already done by the Country Team and what should be done by the ET. Therefore, LWF Haiti will together with the consultants identify the priorities of the team.

The Steps of the Country Strategy building (and some parts of the Evaluation) may include (but are not restricted to):

Staff consultations

Will be done at each project location. By means of appropriate instruments (eg. SWOT analysis), the strengths and weaknesses as well as external opportunities and threats within the operating environment at both project and programme level will be measured.

✚ ***Community consultations***

Will be done at each project location with local officials and community leaders, teachers and others. The discussions will be in relation to future engagements with communities and Government institutions.

✚ ***Consultations with related agencies and other donors***

Will be done in Haiti and via Skype. They are also included in the review exercise as much as possible and will be invited to the country strategy workshop later on.

✚ ***Human resource mapping***

A mapping of the project and programme human resources to determine the level and quality of human resource requirements for efficient and effective operations.

✚ ***Organisational capacity assessment***

An internal appraisal of existing capabilities and aptitude to optimally deliver programmatic commitments

✚ ***Problem analysis***

Analysis of beneficiary livelihood situations in operational areas to determine extent and magnitude of the problems and needs within selected target groups.

✚ ***Risk Analysis***

This involves analysing the potential risks and designing appropriate risk management strategies and monitoring mechanisms for potential risk.

✚ ***Partnership Analysis (including local partners and the ecumenical partners)***

This involves identifying the core partners and discussing their expected role, as well as analysing existing partnerships and discussing their strengths and weaknesses.

✚ ***Documentation Analysis (internal to Country Team)***

Analysis of various country development plans and indicators and other pertinent country documentation to inform the strategy process

It is expected that further discussions with staff and key stakeholders shall take all the results of these various processes into account and come up with a comprehensive analysis to inform the Country Strategy. A discussion regarding the relevance and the sustainability of the CS 2009-2014 will enrich the reflection.

Having done this, the staff shall compile the results of the discussion and put together the vision, mission, priorities, objectives and other pertinent information for the strategy.

The CSR is expected to follow four stages:

Stage I - Preparatory: including making preliminary arrangement such as finalising dates, identifying team members and team leader, commission the process and, assembling and circulating available documents and data from monitoring etc. to Team Members and Team Leader. Study of documentation

Stage II - In-country Evaluation Process proper: in which the Evaluation Team conducts its task in Haiti. This in turn will comprise four general sub-stages, namely.

- briefing session with LWF Haiti and possibly related agencies and other relevant stakeholders;
- interviews with LWF staff, partner agencies based in Haiti.
- field visits to different project locations, focus group discussion with programme participants, meetings with project staff, and other relevant stakeholders
- analysis, further information in Port au Prince and debriefing workshop for all senior staff and key stakeholders.

Stage III - Report drafting by Team Leader, circulating for feedback and incorporating comments before submitting the final Report

Stage IV: Post-Evaluation follow-up: LWF Haiti in consultation with DWS will develop an action plan to guide the programme response.

1.2 Provisional Timetable

The Timetable outlined below shows only the proposed main stages, together with the timeframe, intended locations and persons responsible. Once dates and broad approach are agreed, a more detailed timetable will be developed which will provide details especially of the proposed schedule and arrangements for field visit, meetings with stakeholders and other agencies:

SUGGESTED TIMETABLE

<i>Task</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Venue</i>	<i>Responsible</i>
I. PREPARATORY STAGE			
Finalise TOR, budgets and time, table	September/October		Peo, Petra
Identify and contract Consultants	October		Peo, Petra
Inception and Workplan	November		Team Leader + Peo and Michael French
II. EVALUATION STAGE			
Evaluation Team arrival PP	January 11	LWF Office	Team Leader
Evaluation Debriefing	January 25	LWF Office	Team leader
Departure	January 26		
III COMPLETION STAGE			
Draft Report	February 15		Team leader
Comments	February 15-March 1		Peo, Michael (Petra)
Final report	March 10		Team leader

The timetable for the overall CS process will be drafted apart. The final Country strategy workshop is envisaged for May 6th to May 9th 2014 in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. As a result of the discussion with various stakeholders in the different processes, a Draft Country Strategy shall be presented at the workshop as a working document. The workshop shall then provide an opportunity to participants to validate and endorse the direction of the LWF DWS Haiti/Caribbean Country Programme for the next six years.

4. OUTPUTS of the CSR

Two outputs are envisaged:

First: A debriefing workshop prior to Evaluation Team departure shall present preliminary findings, analysis and recommendations of the evaluation. The purpose is both to inform LWF Caribbean/Haiti stakeholders of the preliminary findings and also to gather input and feedback for analysis.

Second: the final Evaluation Report shall be submitted including the following elements of the report:

- Executive Summary
- Introduction (purpose, ToRs, Methodology, etc.,)
- Background, History
- Country Strategy Objectives and Strategic approaches
- Findings, Analysis and Emerging issues
- Recommendations
- Conclusion
- Annexes
 - ToR
 - Itinerary
 - Meeting report/list of persons met
 - List of references

5. COMPOSITION OF THE EVALUATION TEAM

The Evaluation Team shall comprise at least two full members:

- Team Leader – proposed by LWF/DWS and agreed with the Related Agencies. The Team Leader should have significant experience in leading Evaluation Teams and Processes. Knowledgeable in development and humanitarian programmes, have competence in organisational development and strategic planning, project management and evaluations. A good understanding of the country and region and Emergency programmes. Must be fluent in French and English and knowledge of Kreyol an asset. He/She must be able to work under pressure, delegate, be a team-builder and be responsible to present the report in the time agreed upon.
- One local consultant

A representative from LWF DWS will accompany the ET at least partially, but will not take a specific assignment or role in the team.

LWF Caribbean Haiti will assign a staff member who will be a Resource Person to inform advice and expedite the Team in their work. The Resource Person may

accompany the Evaluation Team for their field visits. At field level, a local Resource Person from either LWF Caribbean Haiti or its Partners will provide the necessary local advice and facilitate the visits and meetings with partners and communities.

Project number and Title	Year	Related to which Strategic Objective	Evaluation done?
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6. DOCUMENTATION

The following documents shall be made available to the Team members, through email, and one master file (hard copy) of the documents shall be available in Haiti for reference. This would include:

- Country Strategy Outline (2009-2014)
- Country Programme Profiles
- Annual Reports
- Project Documents and sample workplans
- Financial Audit Reports (2009-2010)
- Annual Monitoring Report
- Country Evaluation Reports
- Management Tools: Staff Internal Regulations; Organogram ; Monthly Management Reports
- ACT HTI101 Appeal, and others
- ACT Monitoring Report , ACT Peer Review report December 2009
- Background analysis and document on Haiti
- Maps (Country and provinces where projects are located)
- Resource Management Audit (June 2010) and Internal Audits
- Project agreement (FCA, NCA, ICCO, DCA)

Geneva, Port au Prince 7-October 2013

Annex: LWF Haiti, Projects since 2011					
18-4640, Model Resettlement Village For Earthquake Affected Families Of Gressier – Phase 1	1 January 2012 to 31 March 2013	to	Out of the Strategy		
18-4641, Response to Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy	25.8 2012 to 31.12.2012	to	1,2,4,5		
18-4642, Women’s Bank Project	1.9.2012 to 31.12.2014	to	2,3,4,5		
18-4643, Model Resettlement Village For Earthquake Affected Families Of Gressier - Phase 2	01.4.2013 to 31.12.2014	to	1,2,3,4		
18-4644, Access To Potable Water In Grand’Anse Area Of Haiti	01.3.2013 to 31.12.2013	to	4		
18-4645, Sustainable Livelihoods In Bois Bocot Model Village, Gressier	01.1.2013 to 31.12.2013	to	3,4		
18-4646, Organizational Capacity And Mechanisms Generating Revenue Of Rural Communities And Vulnerable In The Region Of Palms	1.6.2013 to 30.11.2013	to	2,3,4,5		
18-4415, Hti121 Assistance To Affected Population By Tropical Storm Isaac And Hurricane Sandy	1.9.2012 to 31.8.2013	to	1,2,3,4,5		
18-4416, Emergency Sub Hub In Haiti	1.1.2013 to 31.12.2013	to	1		
18-4212, Institutional Development	1.1.2009 to 31.12.2011	to	5		MTR 2011
18-4213, Sustainable Livelihoods In Environmentally Critical Areas	1.1.2009 to 31.12.2011	to	1,2,3,4,5		MTR 2011
18-4214, Sustainable Transition Of Previous Interventions	1.1.2009 to 31.12.2011	to	1,2,3,4,5		MTR 2011
18-4215, Integrated Development And Sustainable Livelihoods In rural Communities Of West And Grand’Anse	01.1.2012 to 31.12.2014	to	1,2,3,4,5		
Strategic Objectives					
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The impact of disasters in the communities is reduced, 2. Livelihoods and environment in areas of critical ecological impact are equally managed in a sustainable way, 3. People enjoy fully their rights as citizens of a State guaranteeing a rule of Law, 4. Women and men enjoy equal rights and opportunities in the communities where the programme is working, 5. LWF Haiti and its partners carry out high quality work in an accountable, transparent and coherent manner in order to contribute to high impact in communities. 					